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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two claims are removed to the same federal court on the same day.1  
Essentially, this common disposition is all they share.  In the first action,2 
Westley, a citizen of Wyoming, alleges breach of contract against Vizzini 
Insurance Co., considered a citizen of Texas.  There is one plaintiff and one 
defendant.  At stake is a few thousand dollars, of interest only to the two of 
them.  In the second action,3 Buttercup brings a putative class action against 
an Idaho corporation, Humperdinck, Inc.  Based on the minimal discovery 
completed thus far, the damages are likely well into the millions of dollars, 
but no single claim is worth more than $75,000.  The class Buttercup would 
represent includes thousands of individuals from all over the country, 
including Idaho.  Their relief hangs in the balance.4  She represents their 
interests as well as her own.5  Both plaintiffs have filed motions to remand.6 
Oh, another thing they have in common.  Before removal, both Westley 
and Buttercup filed stipulations that they will neither seek nor accept 
damages exceeding the minimum amount in controversy necessary to invoke 
federal diversity jurisdiction.7  That is to say, they will sacrifice a portion of 
 
 1.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
 2.  As the following facts should make clear, Westley’s case is a typical case requiring complete 
diversity and an amount in controversy of more than $75,000.  See id. § 1332(a).  It is removable 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006). 
 3.  Buttercup’s case is a 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) case removable under § 1453.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1453 (2006). 
 4.  If the class is certified, the res judicata effect of Buttercup’s suit will prevent them from 
bringing another action on this claim or any claims arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions even if they are unhappy with the result and notwithstanding their lack of participation. 
 5.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 6.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2006). 
 7.  Westley will have stipulated to damages of less than $75,000.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  
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their rightful recovery to stay in state court.  In considering each motion to 
remand,8 the issue could be articulated in precisely the same way: Will such 
a binding stipulation defeat removal?  Imagine you are the judge considering 
the question.  Further, imagine there is no binding precedent on this 
question.  What will the answer be?  Will it be the same in both cases?  Why 
or why not? 
These are the questions this Comment seeks to answer—questions that 
the Supreme Court will answer later this term when it decides Standard Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Knowles.9  Westley’s lawsuit is based on St. Paul Mercury 
Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,10 and the answer—that a plaintiff who “does 
not desire to try his case in the federal court . . . may resort to the expedient 
of suing for less than the jurisdictional amount”—is well-established law.11  
The answer in Buttercup’s action is unsettled, but several courts have treated 
the hypothetical questions as identical and permitted binding stipulations to 
defeat removal.12  Of the several problems this creates, the most important is 
also the most obvious.  While, in Westley’s case, the sacrifice made is borne 
by the party controlling the litigation, in Buttercup’s case, absent class 
members with no say in the matter will make the sacrifice. 
The distinction matters now in the wake of the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 (CAFA), which allows defendants to remove class actions to 
federal court so long as minimal diversity exists, the amount in controversy 
is greater than $5 million, and a few other conditions are met.13  Before 
CAFA, total diversity was required and removal jurisdiction could be 
defeated without any sacrifice at all.14  Including a named plaintiff from the 
same state as a named defendant foreclosed the possibility of removal.15  
After CAFA, binding stipulations offer an alternate means of achieving the 
same end.16 
Part II will discuss the historical context in which CAFA arose and early 
 
Buttercup must stipulate to damages of less than $5 million.  See id. § 1332(d)(2). 
 8.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a). 
 9.  Knowles v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 4:11-CV-04044, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139077 
(W.D. Ark. Dec. 2, 2011), cert. granted, 183 L. Ed. 2d 730 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 11-1450). 
 10.  303 U.S. 283 (1938). 
 11.  Id. at 294. 
 12.  See infra notes 138–83 and accompanying text. 
 13.  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 14.  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1450–51 (2008) [hereinafter Burbank, A Preliminary 
View]. 
 15.  Id. at 1451. 
 16.  See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
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techniques designed to circumvent it.17  Part III.A traces the history of the 
class action in federal courts, starting from just after Rule 23 was entirely 
overhauled and the modern class action created in 1966 and concluding with 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,18 which represents the latest example in a 
series of Supreme Court decisions that tend to make state fora more 
attractive than federal.19  Part III.B covers the state of the law with regard to 
this Comment’s precise question.20  Part IV describes the problems that 
binding stipulations create on three planes—their conflicts with Rule 23,21 
considerations of federalism and the Dormant Commerce Clause,22 and their 
poor fit in the modern landscape of complex litigation.23  Finally, Part V 
explicates the deficiencies of judicial approaches employed thus far24 before 
addressing how the newly enacted Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act of 201125 marks a step in the right direction.26  Part V 
closes with a proposal for a per se rule against binding stipulations in these 
cases.27  Part VI concludes.28 
II.  CLEANING UP THE CLASS ACTION 
Hailed as a victory for big business, the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 was signed into law by President George W. Bush after years of 
wrangling.29  Aimed largely at diverting large class action lawsuits into 
 
 17.  See infra notes 29–87 and accompanying text. 
 18.  131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 19.  See infra notes 88–137 and accompanying text. 
 20.  See infra notes 138–83 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See infra notes 184–277 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra notes 278–96 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See infra notes 297–336 and accompanying text. 
 24.  See infra notes 337–63 and accompanying text. 
 25.  Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 
Stat. 758 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).   
 26.  See infra notes 364–83 and accompanying text. 
 27.  See infra notes 384–429 and accompanying text. 
 28.  See infra notes 430–42 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See Bernadette Tansey, Lawyers Size up New Law; Both Sides Ponder Effect of New Federal 
Class Action Act, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 18, 2005, at C1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2005-03-
18/business/17364770_1_class-action-suits-federal-court-state-court; see also Edward A. Purcell Jr., 
The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdiction Reform, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (2008) [hereinafter Purcell, CAFA in Perspective] (“[CAFA] was the 
product of an extended and well-organized political campaign.  In Congress, its passage required a 
grinding eight-year effort, several modifications to the original proposal, numerous committee 
hearings, multiple reports by both Houses, political compromises that drew some Democratic 
support, two unsuccessful attempts to terminate debate in the Senate by imposing cloture, and 
strenuous efforts to amend in both the House and Senate when the bill came to the floor for a final 
vote.  Passage also required Republican control of both Houses of Congress and the presidency as 
well.”). 
  While the legislation had obvious political connotations, President George W. Bush 
disclaimed any antipathy toward the class action device: 
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federal courts,30 the law turned out far different than originally conceived.31  
The problems it had originally been meant to address—convoluted notices 
and the payment of bounties to class representatives, for example—were 
largely ameliorated by judicial innovation32 and by the 2003 amendments to 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.33  Thus, CAFA’s role in 
preventing forum shopping overshadows its inclusion of a “Consumer Class 
Action Bill of Rights.”34  CAFA accomplishes this primary purpose by 
allowing a defendant to remove any class action to federal court where, 
among other things, the aggregate sum in controversy exceeds $5 million, 
minimal diversity exists, and the class consists of at least 100 persons.35  
 
 Class actions can serve a valuable purpose in our legal system.  They allow numerous 
victims of the same wrongdoing to merge their claims into a single lawsuit.  When used 
properly, class actions make the legal system more efficient and help guarantee that 
injured people receive proper compensation.  That is an important principle of justice.  So 
the bill I sign today maintains every victim’s right to seek justice and ensures that 
wrongdoers are held to account. 
Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 1 PUB. PAPERS 270, 271 (Feb. 18, 2005). 
 30.  Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. 
REV. 1593, 1595 (2006) [hereinafter Sherman, After CAFA]. 
 31.  Compare Class Action Fairness Act of 1998, S. 2083, 105th Cong. (1998) (providing, inter 
alia, for limitations on attorney’s fees, allowing removal so long as the aggregate damages exceed 
$75,000 and minimal diversity exists, and amending FRCP 11), with Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, S. 5, 109th Cong. (2005) (declining to amend FRCP 11 or impose any direct limitations on 
attorney’s fees while, among other things, permitting removal where the amount in controversy 
exceeds $5 million and minimal diversity exists, regulating permissible attorneys’ fees in the event 
of coupon settlements, and demanding judicial review of such settlements). 
 32.  See generally BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (3d ed. 2010) (describing ways judges have managed 
class action litigation in the face of various troubling techniques), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/classgd3.pdf/$file/classgd3.pdf. 
 33.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)–(h) advisory committee notes, 2003 amendments (amended to 
provide for judicial review of proposed settlements, establish guidelines and protocols for the 
selection of class counsel, and mandate that notice be sent to all class members informing them of 
the attorney’s fees to be paid and allowing for objections to be heard, among other things).  
Professor Sherman originally made this observation in 2006.  See Sherman, After CAFA, supra note 
30 at 1594–95. 
 34.  See 151 CONG. REC. 2636 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (describing “aggressive 
forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing accomplices in a 
judicial power grab” as “[a] major element of the worsening crisis”); 148 CONG. REC. 3104 (2002) 
(statement of Rep. Cox) (decrying the effects of forum shopping); see also Kevin M. Clermont & 
Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1554 
(2008) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata]. 
 35.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (5)–(6), (11) (2006).  In pertinent part, § 1332 (which provides 
federal courts with diversity jurisdiction) reads as follows:  
 (2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs, and is a class action in which— 
 (A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
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According defendants this limited right to litigate in federal court gives 
CAFA its defendant-friendly reputation. 
Plaintiffs often file class actions in state court.36  In state courts, 
especially a few prime destinations,37 plaintiffs seem to maintain a 
considerable advantage over defendants.38  Class actions get certified with 
relative ease.39  The settlements reached are not subject to the same scrutiny 
 
defendant; 
 (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a 
foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or 
 (C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a 
foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state. 
 . . . . 
 (5) Paragraphs (2) through (4) shall not apply to any class action in which— 
 . . . . 
 (B) the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less than 
100. 
 (6) In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated 
to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs. 
. . . . 
 (11)(A) For purposes of this subsection and section 1453, a mass action shall be 
deemed to be a class action removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise 
meets the provisions of those paragraphs. 
Id. 
 36.  See, e.g., E. Farish Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception Permitting Removal of Diversity 
Cases After One Year: A Welcome Development or the Opening of Pandora’s Box?, 63 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 146, 147 (2011) (noting the general preference of plaintiffs for state courts and defendants for a 
federal forum).  In fact, the preference dates back to the late 1800s.  See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–
1958, at 87 (1992) [hereinafter PURCELL, LITIGATION & INEQUALITY].  Indeed, plaintiffs’ concerns 
may have been even greater then.  Professor Purcell describes the “pivotal legal issue in the system 
of corporate diversity litigation” as being the question of jurisdiction, citing the inconvenience and 
impracticality of travel and the attendant delays of being in federal court as the original reasons.  See 
id.  Within a few years though, the defendant’s advantage became more substantive, and removal 
was often sufficient to end the litigation altogether.  Id.   
 37.  “Forum shopping has resulted in a very small handful of local courts in such places as 
Madison County, Illinois; Jefferson County, Texas; and Palm Beach County, Florida, making law 
for an entire Nation.”  148 CONG. REC. 3104 (2002) (statement of Rep. Cox).  Madison County, 
where only a pair of class action suits were filed in 1998, hosted 106 such actions in 2003.  S. REP. 
NO. 109-14, at 13 (2005).  Accordingly, it has drawn the bulk of Congress’s ire.  See, e.g., 151 
CONG. REC. 2645–46 (2005) (statement of Rep. Keller) (“Madison County, Illinois has been called 
the number one judicial hellhole in the United States. . . . The movie ‘Bridges of Madison County’ 
was a love story.  The ‘Judges of Madison County’ would be a horror flick.”). 
 38.  See Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 57–58 (2009).   
 39.  See Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1654 (2006) (“The federal courts’ reluctance to issue class certification is well 
documented.”).  Kanner’s evidence includes the Senate Report prepared for the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2000, which found: 
[O]ne reason for the dramatic explosion of class actions in State courts is that some State 
court judges are less careful than their Federal court counterparts about applying the 
procedural requirements that govern class actions.  Many State court judges are lax about 
following the strict requirements of rule 23 (or the State's governing rule), which are 
intended to protect the due process rights of both unnamed class members and 
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required under Rule 23.40 
These concerns took center stage in congressional debates over the 
proposed legislation.  Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) painted the 
ominous picture of a few “magnet courts” deciding a disproportionate 
number of class actions and wielding equally disproportionate power.41  
CAFA, he argued, would restore sanity to the system and put national cases 
where they should be—a federal forum.42  Moments before turning over the 
floor, Sensenbrenner predicted the anguish CAFA would cause plaintiffs’ 
firms: 
I suspect you could hear a pin drop in the halls of infamous 
courthouses located in Madison County, Illinois and Jefferson 
County, Texas, where for so long the good times have rolled for 
forum-shopping plaintiffs’ attorneys and the judges who enable 
them.  And when this legislation is signed by the President one day 
soon, those same halls may echo with sobs and curses because this 
time justice and fairness and the American people will have the last 
laugh.43 
These concerns just scrape the surface.  Another problem often cited in 
the legislative history is that of multiple actions, arising out of a single 
 
defendants.  In contrast, Federal courts generally do scrutinize proposed settlements 
much more carefully and pay closer attention to the procedural requirements for 
certifying a matter for class treatment. 
S. REP. NO. 106-420, at 16 (2000). 
 40.  See Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1765, 1820 (2008) [hereinafter Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy]. 
 41.  See 151 CONG. REC. 2636 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“The infamous 
handful of magnet courts known for certifying even the most speculative class action suits . . . . The 
only explanation for this phenomenon is aggressive forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts 
and judges who will act as willing accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases 
and setting policy for the entire country.”). 
 42.  See id. 
 43.  Id.  While class counsel has proven remarkably adaptable, the effects of CAFA and similar 
measures still provoke unrest and discontent.  See generally Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact 
on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593 (2008) [hereinafter Erichson, CAFA’s Impact].  
Whether or not measures like CAFA take money from the pockets of plaintiffs’ attorneys as a group, 
they are viewed with distaste among the plaintiffs’ bar because they often cast the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys as villains.  See id. at 1596–1602; see also Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005: The Story Behind the Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 84 (2009) (“Tort tales provide a tale of morally 
blameworthy individuals (the plaintiffs) who beset blameless, responsible and hardworking 
individuals (the defendants) aided by the most blameworthy of all—the lawyer.”).  Better criticisms 
of the plaintiffs’ bar seem rooted in agency theory.  See infra notes 72, 403–10 and accompanying 
text. 
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alleged tort, filed in numerous jurisdictions.44  Such actions not only force 
the defendant to fight essentially the same battle on multiple fronts but also 
burden the judiciary’s resources.45  Further, they pit the plaintiffs against 
each other in a race to the bottom that only class members cannot win—
defendants win by getting a cheap settlement, class counsel by raking in 
attorney’s fees.46  This “reverse auction” gives defendants leverage by 
allowing them to haggle over the settlement with attorneys representing 
various putative classes.47  In return for guaranteeing class certification, and 
the settlement and fees that come with it, class counsel need only make the 
lowest bid.48  When the dust settles, if all goes well for the defendant,49 all 
 
 44.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005) (“Multiple class action cases purporting to assert 
the same claims on behalf of the same people often proceed simultaneously in different state courts, 
causing judicial inefficiencies and promoting collusive activity.”).  “Duplicative litigation is the 
simultaneous prosecution of two or more suits in which some of the parties or issues are so closely 
related that the judgment in one will necessarily have a res judicata effect on the other.”  RICHARD L. 
MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 103 (4th ed. 2004). 
 45.  See id.  Under CAFA, the actions would presumably be funneled into federal courts, where 
an MDL transfer would allow for resource-saving consolidation.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006); see 
also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 173 (7th ed. 2008) [hereinafter YEAZELL, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE] (“Section 1407 of 28 U.S.C. sets up a judicial panel on multidistrict litigation and 
authorizes it to transfer cases pending in different districts to a single district for coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings. . . .  The theory underlying such consolidation is efficiency . . . .”).     
 46.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 392 (2000) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Action 
Accountability]. 
 47.  See id. at 392 & n.53.  Indeed, even in the absence of parallel class actions, the mere threat 
that one may be filed can lead to a hasty settlement.  Id. 
  The late Professor Richard A. Nagareda proposed in 2003 to reverse the reverse auction “by 
linking the security of incumbent class counsel to the adequacy of the representation that they 
provide.”  Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
287, 371 (2003) [hereinafter Nagareda, Administering Adequacy].  Instead of vying for the 
defendant’s business, the attorneys would compete for the court’s.  See id.  Such a solution, he 
believed, would also ameliorate the problem of magnet jurisdictions because any attorney’s decision 
to settle an action in such a jurisdiction “would serve as a heightened alert for would-be challengers 
to incumbent class counsel.”  Id. at 372.  An auction of this sort would also put the continued use of 
binding stipulations in doubt because the adequacy of any attorney willing to sacrifice a portion of 
his clients’ recovery would similarly serve as an alert. 
 48.  See James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity, & Legitimacy: Federalization of the 
Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 409 (2004).  To effect this agreement, the creation 
of a “settlement class” is necessary.  Id.  “The term ‘settlement class action’ refers to a class action 
that is desigued [sic] to be settled rather than litigated, with the defendant not objecting to 
certification of the class providing the settlement is approved.”  Roger C. Cramton, Individualized 
Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 
823 (1995). 
 49.  Whether an absentee class member can collaterally attack the preclusive effects of a class 
action settlement by alleging inadequate representation after the fact is a question that divided the 
Supreme Court in Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) and thus remains open.  
Different courts have reached different results.  Compare Epstein v. MCA Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that “due process does not require collateral second-guessing of” an original 
finding of adequacy), with State v. Homeside Lending, Inc. 826 A.2d 997 (Vt. 2003) (noting, but 
ultimately disregarding, considerations of comity in determining that a showing of inadequate 
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other putative classes will be estopped from bringing their actions.50  While 
federal courts have the procedural and jurisdictional tools to handle this 
problem, state courts do not.51 
Just as the “reverse auction” affects absentee class members directly and 
negatively, coupon settlements harm only them.52  While the oft vilified 
form of settlement53—instead of paying out cash, class members receive 
coupons54—may have some merit,55 it generally does little to make plaintiffs 
 
representation nullified any preclusive effect of a prior proceeding in Alabama).  Vigorous defenses 
of both approaches have emerged in the academy.  Compare Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The 
Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 765 (1998) (arguing that such collateral attacks should be deemed impermissible), with 
Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate 
Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2004) (“Due process is, however, always in 
tension with efficiency, speed and finality. . . I say the simple and longstanding answer on the 
question of collateral attack is right and should be preserved.”), and Patrick Woolley, The 
Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX L. REV. 383 
(2000) (arguing a similar position); see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due 
Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2131 (2008) 
[hereinafter Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process] (arguing that “collateral attack must 
remain a part of the class member’s potential repertoire of responses to collusion or malfeasance, 
albeit a disfavored response, in at least some cases”). 
 50.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield 
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 605 (2008) (“Class settlement agreements today involve a kind of 
business transaction in which the commodity ‘bought and sold’ consists of the preclusive effect that 
the judgment in the class action stands to exert vis-à-vis class members’ claims.”) [hereinafter 
Nagareda, The Administrative State]. 
 51.  See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION 162 (2d ed. 
2010).  For further discussion of federal courts’ advantage in this regard, see infra Part IV.C. 
 52.  See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 544–45 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (“The defendants . . . 
get off cheaply, the plaintiffs’ (and defendants’) lawyers get the only real money that changes hands 
and the court, which approves the settlement, clears its docket of troublesome litigation.”). 
 53.  See Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 810, 811 (1996) (describing 
various criticisms heaped on coupon settlements). 
 54.  Id. at 810. “For example, class members in one case recovered coupons valid for a discount 
on the purchase of new food processors.  Other class action plaintiffs have secured discounts on 
transatlantic air travel, groceries homesite purchases, bar review courses and legal texts, and 
brokerage fees.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 55.  See Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 98 (1997) (writing with the “goal . . . to replace some of the recent hysteria 
about coupon and other nonpecuniary settlements with a more balanced account that identifies the 
benefits, as well as the costs, of such agreements”).  Coupon settlements are just one of five types of 
nonpecuniary settlements the article discusses; the other four being: “distributions of securities, 
monitoring for future harm, reverter funds in which unclaimed settlement funds return to the 
defendant, and fluid recovery funds where unclaimed settlement funds are distributed to persons 
other than injured class members.”  Id. at 98–99.  Miller and Singer define coupon settlements:  
 A coupon settlement is a settlement where the defendant creates a right for class 
members to obtain a discount on future purchases of the defendant’s products or services.  
The right to receive a discount is the consideration class members receive instead of an 
immediate cash payment. The defendant receives a release from legal claims and the 
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whole.56  Their attorneys, on the other hand, can create substantial windfalls 
for themselves by securing such a settlement, and defendants get off light 
when the coupons go unused.57  In some cases, they even turn a profit on the 
transaction.58 
The coupon settlement likely attracts so much attention because it is a 
vivid example of the incongruities created by the mass tort class action—
who has not been awarded one only to find it worthless?—but its criticisms 
represent no mere stalking horse hiding a pro-business agenda.59  Rather, it 
is a real problem that Congress addressed with the enactment of CAFA.60  
 
benefit of the consumers’ increased incentives to purchase one of its products or services. 
Id. at 102.   
  As the definition accounts for, an ancillary and inevitable effect of the settlement is to 
incentivize a renewed customer–retailer relationship between the victim and the tortfeasor.  This 
perverse consequence seems to have no analogue in the field of remedies, and one cannot help but 
feel a little uncomfortable at the transactional dynamic.  This observation has not been lost on 
commentators.  See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in 
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1028–29 (2002). 
 56.  Leslie, supra note 55, at 1037.  Among the chief reasons is the simple fact that these 
coupons are rarely redeemed.  Id. at 1035 (describing redemption rates ranging from a high of 26.3% 
to a low of 3%). 
 57.  See Leslie, supra note 55, at 993. 
 58.  Leslie, supra note 55, at 994. 
  Of course, CAFA is not a cure-all, and discretion is left to judges.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) 
(2006).  For a post-CAFA case tying together many of the concepts described supra notes 42–56 and 
accompanying text, see Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007).  In 
Figueroa, the action was one of several filed against Sharper Image in state and federal courts 
alleging that the Ionic Breeze® air purifier was defective.  Id. at 1294.  A “reverse auction” ensued, 
resulting in a coupon settlement—Figueroa had seemingly won the race to the bottom.  See id. at 
1297.  Despite the unreserved support of Professor Leslie, the settlement was ultimately rejected by 
the district court in light of the objections of named class representatives from parallel class actions 
as well as the attorneys general of several states.  See id. at 1313–15.  While the case goes a long 
way in showing that federal courts have not perfected the class action—by adding a defendant not 
named in the parallel actions, Figueroa avoided section 1404 transfer and abstention under the 
Colorado River Doctrine—the coupon settlement itself, despite being a failure ultimately, was 
greatly improved by CAFA’s provisions.  See id. at 1295–96, 1323.  When objected to, the parties 
went back to the drawing board and incorporated suggested changes.  Id. at 1323.  Indeed, Professor 
Leslie was brought in to advise on the settlement terms by Sharper Image after his work was cited 
repeatedly by objectors.  See id. at 1313.  The final product, in Professor Leslie’s words, “more than 
satisfie[d] the CAFA standard and [w]ould provide an excellent model for post-CAFA coupon 
settlements.”  Id.  In the end, District Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga’s detailed, thorough opinion 
rejecting the settlement demonstrated that CAFA’s added protections have teeth.  See id. at 1315. 
 59.  See generally Leslie, supra note 55 (describing various problems with in-kind settlements).  
Opponents of CAFA tend to downplay the importance of coupon settlements, portraying them as 
atypical and sui generis.  See, e.g., Burbank, A Preliminary View, supra note 14, at 1448 (referring to 
CAFA’s treatment of coupon settlements as “legislation by anecdote”). 
 60.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §3, 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006).  CAFA’s approach to 
coupon settlements has been criticized heavily.  See, e.g., J. Brendan Day, Comment, My Lawyer 
Went to Court and All I Got Was This Lousy Coupon! The Class Action Fairness Act's Inadequate 
Provision for Judicial Scrutiny over Proposed Coupon Settlements, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1085, 
1088 (2008) (outlining various perceived shortcomings in the statute); Robert H. Klonoff & Mark 
Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. 
L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2006) (“Congress lacked any clear understanding of what it was trying to fix.  
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State courts, on the other hand, offer no uniform protections.61  And when 
individual states erect them, forum-shopping plaintiffs can take their 
business elsewhere.62  Or, they could before CAFA. 
As predicted by Representative Sensenbrenner,63 plaintiffs’ attorneys 
reacted swiftly.  The flurry of class action lawsuits filed just before the 
legislation became effective demonstrated their distaste for CAFA.64  
Attorneys pledged to circumvent the law.65  One attempted solution—filing 
a number of separate lawsuits based on the same alleged wrong—is wildly 
inefficient and costly.66  Accordingly, courts have treated it with suspicion.67  
Crafting state-specific classes offers one means of keeping cases in state 
courts, but it is not always practical.68  Consequently, many techniques 
 
As a result, the so-called ‘problem’ of class action settlements is ill-defined, and Congress has 
passed a series of unrelated provisions that achieve little and raise more questions than they 
answer.”); Purcell, CAFA in Perspective, supra note 29, at 1874 (noting that where a case has been 
filed in state court, a collusive plaintiff and defendant could keep the case there and avoid CAFA’s 
coupon settlement provisions altogether).   
  It is the shortcoming that Purcell identifies, and another related to the local exception carve-
out, that seems to have inspired the single harshest criticism of CAFA to emerge from the academy.  
See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and 
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942 (2006) (“[The provisions] meet the philosopher Harry 
Frankfurt’s definition of ‘bullshit,’ because they are made with apparent indifference to their truth 
content.”). 
  For all these criticisms, Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga had no trouble interpreting them to great 
effect in Figueroa, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292.  See supra note 58; see also Sobel v. Hertz Corp., No. 
3:06–CV–00545–LRH–RAM, 2011 WL 2559565 (D. Nev. June 27, 2011) (undertaking a rigorous 
analysis pursuant to CAFA and rejecting a proposed coupon settlement). 
 61.  See Purcell, CAFA in Perspective, supra note 29, at 1847. 
 62.  This is, of course, the essence of forum shopping, and the point is that state court protections 
against coupon settlements will often be only as good as the weakest state.  See Suzanna Sherry, 
Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 
138–39 (2011) (“Instead of choosing between state and federal courts in order to obtain the benefit 
of state or federal law, litigants now choose among courts . . . located in different states in order to 
obtain the benefit of a particular state’s law.”); Donald Earl Childress III, Redeeming Erie: A 
Response to Suzanna Sherry, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 155, 160 (2011) (describing “horizontal forum-
shopping between the several states”). 
 63.  See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 64.  See Tansey, supra note 29 (quoting class action attorney Brad Seligman’s comment, “A lot 
of lawyers are already starting to think how to write lawsuits to get around it”). 
 65.  See, e.g., id. 
 66.  Parties must spend the extra sums associated with pursuing or defending each different 
action.  Courts must expend additional resources in handling them. 
 67.  See, e.g., Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 406 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that “[b]ecause no colorable basis for dividing the claims . . . other than to avoid the clear 
purpose of CAFA [existed], remand was not proper”); Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-148, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72467, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 23, 2008) (“[T]he plaintiff herein with his 
eleven class action complaints cannot create duplicative class action litigation and arbitrarily 
‘gerrymander’ time frames in order to evade the purview of the CAFA.”). 
 68.  See Sherman, After CAFA, supra note 30, at 1598 (“A determination whether two-thirds of 
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revolve around manipulating the amount in controversy, giving rise to the 
“indeterminate complaint,”69 the “lowball complaint,”70 and finally, 
stipulations purporting to limit damages sought.71  These creative and 
inspired strategies belie the trite canard of villainous, scheming plaintiffs’ 
attorneys out to make a quick buck; from a purely legal perspective, it is 
some adroit maneuvering on their part.  However, they endeavor to avoid a 
system—federal courts—designed to minimize the structural problems 
inherent in the class action device that divide the interests of class members 
and their counsel, and, in a less sophisticated system, “abuses” of the type 
decried by Congress will inevitably flourish.72 
 
the class members are citizens of the forum state may sometimes involve a fact question that can not 
easily be answered since neither class counsel nor defendants would necessarily have information 
about the domicile of each class member.”).   
  One method that can work, at least in certain circumstances, is defining the class in terms of 
state citizenship.  See, e.g., Grimsdale v. Kash N’ Karry Food Stores, Inc. (In re Hannaford Bros. 
Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 564 F.3d 75, 76 (1st Cir. 2009) (remanding an action back to 
state court where the “class[,] defined to consist entirely of Florida citizens[,] sued a single 
corporation, also a Florida citizen, in Florida state court”). 
 69.  The indeterminate complaint is one that leaves vague the sum of damages requested.  See 
Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Controversy Cannot be 
Determined from the Face of Plaintiff’s Complaint: The Need for Judicial and Statutory Reform to 
Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV. 681, 686 (1997).  Because 
many states do not require that damages be pleaded with specificity, and some states expressly 
prohibit such pleading, federal courts—who of course require that the pleading at least makes clear 
the minimum jurisdictional threshold has been reached, see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)—have trouble 
determining whether remand is proper.  See Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 751 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“Indeterminate complaints pose two independent analytical problems, which 
should not be, but sometimes are, confused.” (quoting Robinson v. Quality Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 
572, 575 (S.D. Ala. 1986))).  With regard to § 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction, i.e. classic diversity 
jurisdiction, Congress recently passed legislation aimed at fixing this problem.  See infra Part V.   
 70.  A lowball complaint is one in which the pleading requests specific damages less than the 
jurisdictional amount.  See Noble-Allgire, supra note 69, at 691.  Such complaints are sometimes 
treated practically as stipulations, see, e.g., Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994 (9th 
Cir. 2007), but there is no doubt that a mere “lowball complaint” would not often limit the plaintiff’s 
recovery while an effective stipulation always would.  As with the indeterminate complaint, 
Congress has taken recent steps to fix the problem it creates.  See infra Part V. 
 71.  See, e.g., McClendon v. Challenge Fin. Investors Corp., No. 1:11 CV 1597, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 128178, at *8–10 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2011); see also Don Zupanec, Class Action Fairness 
Act—Removal—Amount in Controversy—Damages Stipulation, 27 NO. 3 FED. LITIGATOR 10 (2012).  
Under the heading “Litigation Tips,” Zupanec writes, “There are ways of pleading around CAFA 
jurisdiction[, including to] . . . limit the request for relief to less than CAFA's $5 million aggregate 
jurisdictional minimum.”  Id. 
 72.  That is, the problem is not one of attorney greed so much as it is one of agency costs, as 
described in a series of influential works by professor John C. Coffee.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288 (2010); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better 
Than “Voice,” 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407 (2009); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of 
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. 
L. Rev. 877 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation]; John C. Coffee Jr., 
Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee 
Jr., Rethinking the Class Action]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative 
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While CAFA seems riddled with holes just waiting to be exploited by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys,73 Congress was hardly caught unaware.  Pertinently, 
even the Supreme Court-sanctioned practice of pleading to avoid jurisdiction 
was censured by the 2005 Senate Report prepared in advance of the 
legislation.74  Under the heading “How Diversity Jurisdiction and Removal 
Statutes Are Abused,” the report condemned the practice of including in the 
complaint a declaration that no plaintiff will seek damages greater than 
$75,000 because plaintiffs can subsequently “amend their complaints after 
the removal to seek more relief and even though the class action seeks 
millions of dollars in the aggregate.”75 
Of course, legislative history is not law.76  Nothing in CAFA’s text 
prohibits those very same “abuses” from emerging anew in the post-CAFA 
 
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney].   
  “[A]gency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work.”  Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989).  In the class 
action context, the agent is the plaintiffs’ attorney, and the principal is the named representative.  See 
Coffee Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra, at 883–84. 
 Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships.  The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of 
the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to 
verify what the agent is actually doing. . . . The second is the problem of risk sharing that 
arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk.  The problem 
here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of the 
different risk preferences. 
Eisenhardt, supra, at 58. 
 73.  See Burbank, A Preliminary View, supra note 14, at 1541 (noting that “the statute’s studied 
ambiguity on critical questions has already generated a great deal of litigation”); see also Clermont 
& Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata, supra note 34, at 1560–61 (noting that, with 182 relevant district court 
opinions and 44 relevant circuit court opinions in the first two and a half years after CAFA took 
effect, it had “already generated an impressive hillock of case law”). 
 74.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 10–11 (2005). 
 75.  See id. 
 76.  See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 45 (1975) (“[L]egislative intention, without 
more, is not legislation.”); cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983) (finding unconstitutional 
the “legislative veto” because it neither satisfied the requirement of bicameral passage nor the 
Presentment Clause). 
  The legislative history of CAFA is especially criticized.  See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, 
supra note 51, at 334 (“[T]he [Senate] Report presents unique problems.  It is dated . . . eleven days 
after CAFA’s passage and ten days after President Bush had signed CAFA into law.”).  Whether or 
not this makes a difference is a subject of debate among the circuit courts.  Compare Blockbuster, 
Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the “probative value for divining 
legislative intent” as “minimal” due to the timing of the Report’s publication), with Lowery v. Ala. 
Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1206 n.50 (11th Cir. 2007) (“While the report was issued ten days 
following CAFA’s enactment, it was submitted to the Senate on February 3, 2006—while that body 
was considering the bill.”). 
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landscape.77  It took less than two years for the first mention of a binding 
stipulation to appear in a federal court opinion.78  And the damages 
stipulation has since grown in stature.79  Stipulations and their functional 
relatives come in a few varieties.80  The true stipulation, which purports to 
bind the plaintiffs to damages less than $5 million, is at least commendable 
for its honesty.81  It is a straightforward pledge that the amount in 
controversy will in no case exceed the minimum amount in controversy 
established by CAFA.82  Less defensible is what might be called the 
phantom stipulation.83  It seems to be a mere tool of obfuscation, suggesting 
to the court and to the defendant that the amount in controversy will not 
exceed the minimum amount in controversy.84  It functions to defeat removal 
 
 77.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.).  Of course, the statute’s silence on these very “abuses” is exemplified by the 
cases discussed and cited infra Part III.B. 
 78.  See Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 06-592-HA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95697, 
at *7 (D. Or. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 79.  This is especially true in the Eighth Circuit where Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953 (8th 
Cir. 2009), has created a “roadmap” for their effective use.  See infra notes 154–69 and 
accompanying text.  In other jurisdictions, the binding stipulation is hardly necessary because a 
nonbinding prayer for relief can be sufficient.  See infra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.  In 
these jurisdictions, binding stipulations have seemingly not gained traction only because they are not 
necessary—a “lowball complaint” will suffice.  See infra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.  In 
these circuits, where the acceptability of binding stipulations is assumed but not yet important, a 
solution to lowball complaints must be found before a solution to binding stipulations is of any 
particular import.  See infra Part V.B–C. 
 80.  While lowball and indeterminate complaints are categorically different from binding 
stipulations, in jurisdictions where the defendant must prove to a legal certainty that removal is 
proper, they can serve essentially the same function, with the added benefit of not limiting plaintiff 
recovery—except in those few jurisdictions in which the complaint’s ad damnum clause is binding.  
In the absence of legislation analogous to the recently enacted Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification 
Act of 2011, prohibiting binding stipulations will be of limited effect.  See infra Part V.C.1. 
 81.  In a Memorandum Opinion and Order out of the Western District of Arkansas, Judge P.K. 
Holmes III described a quintessential example:  
 Attached to the Complaint is a “Sworn and Binding Stipulation,” signed by Plaintiff, 
affirming that he will not at any time during the pendency of the case “seek damages for 
myself or any other individual class member in excess of $75,000 (inclusive of costs and 
attorneys’ fees) or seek damages for the class as alleged in the complaint to which this 
stipulation is attached in excess of $5,000,000 in the aggregate (inclusive of costs and 
attorneys’ fees).” 
Smith v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla, No. 2:11–cv–02113, 2011 WL 6090275, at *2 (W.D. Ark. 
Dec. 7, 2011).  As has become standard practice in the Eighth Circuit, the stipulation was effective, 
and the case was remanded to state court.  See id. at *8; see also infra notes 154–69 and 
accompanying text. 
 82.  See, e.g., Smith, 2011 WL 6090275, at *2; Tuberville v. New Balance Shoe Athletic Shoe, 
Inc., No. 1:11–cv–01016, 2011 WL 1527716, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 21, 2011). 
 83.  This category includes nonbinding stipulations, which serve only to put courts and 
defendants in an awkward spot, as well as lowball complaints, which serve the same function but at 
least do not pretend to be binding.  See Noble-Allgire, supra note 69, at 691–92. 
 84.  See id. 
 The issue is controversial . . . in jurisdictions that do not limit the plaintiff to the 
amount of damages pled in the complaint. . . . As a result, the specific amount of damages 
requested in the plaintiff’s complaint is not necessarily a true indication of the amount in 
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in various ways.  In some jurisdictions, it raises the burden of proof on the 
defendant, making remand nearly inevitable even when jurisdiction was 
proper.85  In other cases, the defendant operates initially under the 
impression that the amount in controversy is less than the statutory amount.86  
By the time it becomes clear that removal is warranted, the opportunity to do 
so has passed.87 
III.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A.  Federal Courts’ Longstanding Prudential Approach to Class 
Certification and the Corresponding Attractiveness of State Fora to 
Plaintiffs 
More than ever before, federal class action jurisprudence is littered with 
obstacles standing between putative plaintiff classes and class certification.88  
This is especially true in the wake of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,89 a 
recent Supreme Court case further constricting Rule 23’s class action 
certification requirements.90  While the case has received much attention and 
 
controversy. Although the plaintiff requests a specific sum that falls below the federal 
jurisdictional threshold, the plaintiff is not bound by that figure. Therefore, the 
defendant’s exposure may in fact be much greater than the federal jurisdictional cut-off. 
The federal court’s dilemma, then, is to determine whose interests should prevail. 
Id. at 692 (citation omitted).  The Sixth Circuit, which seems to uniformly give truly binding 
stipulations effect, see infra notes 170–72, has warily refused to treat a phantom stipulation in the 
same manner.  See Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that a mere “disclaimer in a complaint regarding the amount of recoverable damages does 
not preclude a defendant from removing the matter to federal court” (emphasis added)); Reagan v. 
ArcelorMittal, No. 2:11–CV–35, 2012 WL 1023107, at *1–*2, *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2012) (citing 
Smith and holding that complaint’s allegation that “Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class 
limit their aggregate class-wide claims for relief to less than [$4,999,999.00] and specifically 
disclaim [all] damages or other relief greater than [$4,999,999.00]” was ineffective, presumably 
because it did not even purport to be binding). 
 85.  See, e.g., Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that because the “Plaintiff claimed only damages ‘in total, less than five million dollars,’” 
the complaint was one requesting a “specific amount of damages” and, accordingly, the burden was 
on the defendant to show to a “legal certainty” that damages would not exceed $5 million). 
 86.  See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 16 (2011) (explaining that the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Clarification Act of 2011 will make such practices per se bad faith, removable after more 
than one year). 
 87.  See id. 
 88.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2566–67 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s holding superimposes the strict requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 
onto (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes). 
 89.  131 S. Ct. 2541(majority opinion). 
 90.  See id. at 2552 (holding that a common question is insufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)—a 
“common answer” is required). 
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generated commensurate controversy,91 it was, in large part, a unanimous 
decision reflecting not an ideological struggle—the corporate world versus 
the common man or the continued fight for gender equality, pick your 
narrative—but a rather consistent prudential approach92 to class action law 
suits. 
The pattern began in 1969, less than five years after the 1966 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ushered in the modern 
era of class action litigation.93  That year, in Snyder v. Harris,94 the Court 
held that “separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated” to reach the 
amount in controversy, thus defeating a plaintiff’s attempt to bring her class 
action in federal court.95  Four years later, in Zahn v. International Paper 
Co.,96 the Court held that each plaintiff in a class action brought under Rule 
23 must independently meet the minimum jurisdictional requirement.97  The 
next year, the Court held that “[i]ndividual notice must be sent to all class 
members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable 
effort” and that the plaintiff must bear the cost of sending the notices.98  
Finally, completing the triumvirate of class-constricting 1970s Supreme 
Court decisions, the court held interlocutory appeals following the denial of 
class certification to be impermissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.99  Thus, as 
Professor Carol Rice Andrews points out in her thorough treatment of the 
topic,100 commentators of the time were already looking at state courts as the 
inevitable destination of would-be class action litigants.101 
 
 91.  Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy, 2010–2011 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 319, 321. 
 92.  See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National 
Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1326 (2005) (noting that Supreme 
Court rulings on the matter tended to be based on Rule 23 rather than the Constitution). 
 93.  See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1753, 
1756 (3d ed. 2005) (“The provisions for representative actions were completely rewritten and 
augmented in 1966.”). 
 94.  394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
 95.  Id. at 337–39. 
 96.  414 U.S. 291 (1973), abrogated by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 
546 (2005) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 overruled Zahn and authorized supplemental 
jurisdiction). 
 97.  See id. at 301.  
 98.  See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).  In Eisen, signaling the trouble 
the holding would mean for plaintiff classes, the Court acknowledged that the instant litigation, 
wherein 2.25 million notices required dispatch, would likely die there.  See id. at 175–76.  
Considering the text of Rule 23, such concerns could not affect the analysis.  See id. at 176 (“There 
is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of 
particular plaintiffs.”). 
 99.  See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 464–65 (1978). 
 100.  Professor Andrews provides a helpful history and analysis of the Supreme Court’s on-point 
decisions and their effects in cases beginning with Zahn and ending with the enactment of CAFA.  
See generally Andrews, supra note 92. 
 101.  See, e.g., Barry Abrams, Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction Over 
Class Actions, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1978) (“The foreclosure of the federal courts as a forum 
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for many consumer class actions has focused increasing attention on the state courts as the only 
available judicial forum.”).  But see Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra note 40, at 1774 (“At 
that time, the prevailing academic view was that federal courts were more attractive to plaintiffs 
. . . .” (citing Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1977))).  The 
easiest explanation for this difference of opinion may simply be that Professor Neuborne was 
considering only jurisdiction arising from constitutional questions while Professor Abrams was 
referring to diversity actions.  Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the 
Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 238–39 (1988) (noting that his article will be limited to 
constitutional questions because, “[i]n part, . . . the parity debate in the cases and scholarly literature 
has centered on constitutional cases”).  It seems abundantly clear that the answer to each question 
likely hinged on whether the claim brought was constitutional or a simple class action, and the 
friendliness vel non of federal courts to class actions during that period is really the only question 
pertinent to this Comment. 
  Judge Guido Calabresi, on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and 
Kevin S. Schwartz, an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and former law clerk to Judge 
Calabresi, offer a counter-narrative, not as to what the “prevailing academic views” at the time were 
(which is all Professors Andrews and Marcus differ on), but with regard to the way it really was.  
See generally Guido Calabresi & Kevin S. Schwartz, The Costs of Class Actions: Allocation and 
Collective Redress in the U.S. Experience, 32 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 169 (2011).  Without citing Snyder, 
Zahn, or Coopers, the article argues that:  
[I]n the decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s, class actions were 
favoured because they allowed people to bring suits that otherwise would not be 
economically feasible, because they enabled individuals, who otherwise lacked effective 
strength or large enough economic damages, to bring such suits, and because they often 
would bring about settlements. 
Id. at 174.   
  Their history begins a year after Zahn, in 1974, with Eisen, which, in their words, “allowed 
trial courts to take an active role in creating the class; they encouraged trial courts to bring classes 
together and to certify a class action whenever such courts thought a class action was worthwhile.”  
Id. at 173.  While Eisen certainly has kind words for class actions—as did George W. Bush when he 
signed CAFA into law, supra note 29—Calebrisi and Schwartz neglect that its central holding 
spelled defeat for the plaintiffs in that case and substantially burdened plaintiffs to follow.  See supra 
note 98 and accompanying text.   
  The next year, the Court held in Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) that, because 
Rule 23 included no geographical limitations, nationwide class actions were permissible.  Califano, 
442 U.S. at 702.  Consistent with Professor Andrews’s account, the holding relied entirely on the 
Rule’s text, and the Court even noted that “a federal court when asked to certify a nationwide class 
should take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate in the case before it, and that 
certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the litigation of similar issues in 
other judicial districts.”  Id.  This fact-bound holding, see id. at 703, did little to foster federal 
acceptance of class actions generally.  Indeed, the idea that a nationwide class can theoretically be 
certified under Rule 23 is taken for granted modernly and not seen as a controversial idea cutting 
against the proposition that federal courts and putative classes often find themselves at loggerheads.  
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (ordering the decertification of a 
“nationwide class action” comprised of over a million current and former Wal-Mart employees 
without ever treating the geographical scope of the class as inherently problematic). 
  Finally, the Calabresi–Schwartz disco-era triumvirate concludes with U.S. Parole 
Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).  In this case, the plaintiff-friendly holding did rely on 
constitutional grounds.  The question was whether Article III standing remained when the class had 
been denied certification, the plaintiff appealed, and the case was then mooted as to the named 
plaintiff.  See id. at 390.  Because the question was constitutional in nature, prudential concerns had 
no place in the analysis, and the Court held only that “an action brought on behalf of a class does not 
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 State courts did not present the same obstacles.  State courts did 
not have jurisdictional amount limitations on their subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  In addition, states could offer more flexible 
procedures.  To be sure, many states adopted a class action rule 
based on the federal rule.  In fact, state adoption of Rule 23 
facilitated class action procedure in state courts, but state courts 
were free to apply their own interpretations of Rule 23.  Some states 
adopted class action rules that were more liberal than Rule 23.  
Finally, states could allow their appellate courts to review class 
certification decisions.  Thus, although federal courts were 
effectively closed to many small claims class actions, state courts 
were not . . . .102 
In the mid-eighties, procedural class action questions once again found 
their way to the Supreme Court.  The intended ramifications of the Court’s 
ruling in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts103 were initially unclear—the 
 
become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff’s substantive claim, even though class 
certification has been denied” because the named “representative retains a ‘personal stake’ in 
obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not undermined.”  Id. at 404. 
  In fact, the Court addressed a second relevant issue, and its holding, on firmly prudential 
grounds, was certainly not friendly to plaintiff classes.  The Third Circuit panel below had 
established the rule that in cases where class certification is denied, the district court had an 
affirmative obligation to sua sponte determine whether subclasses might be appropriate.  Id. at 407–
08.  Holding that “it is not the District Court that is to bear the burden of constructing subclasses,” 
the Court reversed.  Id. at 408–09.  The Court ultimately remanded the case back to the district court.  
See id. at 407.  In the end, the district court certified only a limited class and then found against the 
plaintiff on the merits—two rulings the Third Circuit upheld on appeal.  See Geraghty v. U.S. Parole 
Comm’n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 455 U.S. 388 (1980). 
  While it is important to acknowledge this counter-narrative—if nothing else, it is a good 
reminder that there are two sides even to histories—Professor Andrews’s focus on holdings and 
consequences over platitudes and asides seems to have yielded a more instructive chronicle.  See 
generally Andrews, supra note 92.  See also Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and 
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 679 (1979) 
(“It was a very difficult time for the class action practitioner, and the viability of the device itself 
was in serious doubt.  The picture was made all the bleaker by the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
decisions in Snyder v. Harris, Zahn v. International Paper Co., and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.” 
(citations omitted)).  Further, Judge Calabresi and Schwartz’s conclusion that “the Supreme Court 
and the federal courts by the year 2000 had turned around and had become unfavorable to class 
actions” frames the Court’s recent decisions as representative of a sea change in the thinking of 
federal courts that state courts, by contrast, have avoided.  See Calabresi & Schwartz, supra, at 176 
(emphasis added).  This characterization of events casts suspicion on the recent approach of federal 
courts and implicit approbation on an imagined consistent approach by state courts that is simply not 
supported by the cases cited and neglected.  See id. (“Increasingly, the federal courts interpreted 
Rule 23 against certification, while the state courts were still interpreting Rule 23 in favour of 
certification.” (emphasis added)). 
 102.  Andrews, supra note 92, at 1319 (citations omitted).  
 103.  472 U.S. 797 (1985).  The petitioner was a purchaser and producer of natural gas and held 
leases in eleven different states for the purpose.  Id. at 799.  The plaintiff class was made up of 
approximately 28,000 royalty owners with interests in those leases properties and hailed from all 
fifty states, plus Washington D.C. and a number of foreign countries.  Id.  What appears to be a 
nettlesome conflict of laws problem was initially handled quite simply: the plaintiffs filed their suit 
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Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, with the holdings cutting in 
opposite directions vis-à-vis accessibility to courts—but the effect, 
revitalization of nationwide class actions, quickly became clear.104  First, the 
Court rejected the argument that jurisdiction could not be constitutionally 
exercised over plaintiffs without contacts in the forum state, a holding that 
cleared the way, constitutionally, for such actions.105  Second, the Court held 
that the imposition of one state’s law on parties with no contact to that state 
cannot be “arbitrary and unfair” and that “an important element [of fairness] 
is the expectation of the parties.”106  Thus, the state’s law can only be 
applied where that state has a “significant contact or aggregation of 
contacts” with the state.107  While the second holding seemed to create yet 
another roadblock for putative classes, it has proven easily surmountable.108  
With Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman109—holding that state procedural rules could 
govern class action certification without running afoul of the 
Constitution110—ensuring that certain states would be inherently more 
plaintiff-friendly than others, the benefits of forum shopping were more 
clear than ever.111 
Just two years later, Congress accidentally stumbled into the fray by 
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1367.112  The statute was designed to overrule the 
 
in a Kansas state court and Kansas applied its law to each and every one of the claims.  Id.  
However, the petitioner contended that the Constitution proscribed “the application of Kansas law to 
all of the transactions between petitioner and respondents,” and the Court agreed.  Id. 
  While the named plaintiff, Irl Shutts, was a resident of Kansas, his gas leases were in 
Oklahoma and Texas.  Id. at 800–01.  Still, his ties to the state were considerably stronger than most 
of those in the class.  See id. at 801.  Less than four percent of the class members resided in Kansas, 
and only “approximately one quarter of one percent” of the actual leases in question were within the 
state.  Id.  Thus, Kansas’s relation to the litigation was tenuous at best.   
 104.  See Andrews, supra note 92, at 1323. 
 105.  See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808 (“The burdens placed by a State upon an absent class-action 
plaintiff are not of the same order or magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant.”).  The 
bases of the holdings are significant because they demonstrate that limitations on federal jurisdiction 
of these cases consistently tends to be prudential rather than constitutional.  See Andrews, supra note 
92, at 1313 (“In federal court, this issue principally is one of policy . . . .”). 
 106.  Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822. 
 107.  Id. at 821. 
 108.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 662 F.3d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A state court is 
rarely forbidden by the Constitution to apply its own state’s law.”). 
 109.  486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 110.  Id. at 722. 
 111.  See Andrews, supra note 92, at 1324 (noting that the holding permits states to “provide 
forum shopping incentives to class counsel”). 
 112.  Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
KILLIAN-SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2012  10:23 AM 
 
130 
Court’s holding in Finley v. United States113 and restore to the federal 
judiciary the long-utilized doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction.114  While 
Congress seemingly wanted the statute to have no effect on class actions,115 
it did not take long for courts to start ruling that it abrogated Zahn and 
expanded federal court jurisdiction for class actions via its codification of 
supplemental jurisdiction.116  While it can be debated whether Congress’s 
intentions should preclude any overruling of Zahn,117 a plain reading of the 
statute indicates that class actions are within its scope.118  So held the 
Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.119  Subject 
to statutory exceptions, jurisdiction was established so long as some of the 
claims were within the court’s original jurisdiction; § 1367 supplemental 
jurisdiction would apply to the rest.120  While the holding made federal court 
 
 113.  490 U.S. 545 (1989), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-650, sec. 310(a), § 1367, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113–14, as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).   
  Finley began with a plane crash.  See id. at 546.  Barbara Finley lost her husband and two of 
her children when a twin-engine plane carrying them hit power lines while on final approach into a 
San Diego airport.  Id.  Alleging insufficient lighting, Finley sued the United States in federal court, 
alleging that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had been negligent.  Id.  The complaint was 
later amended to add as parties San Diego Gas and Electric Company and the city of San Diego.  Id.  
The district court permitted the amendment, “assert[ing] ‘pendent’ jurisdiction” over the state law 
claims.  Id. at 546–47.  Due to the novel nature of the precise question, the district court certified an 
interlocutory appeal and was subsequently reversed by the Ninth Circuit.  Id. at 547.  Relying 
primarily on statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed.  See id. at 554–56. 
 114.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 3, 8–9 (1992). 
 115.  See H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 29 (1990) (“The section is not intended to affect the 
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions . . . .”); see also 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 573 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “[t]he legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides powerful confirmation” that the 
statute was not meant to overrule Zahn). 
 116.  See, e.g., Patterson Enters. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (D. Kan. 
1993); Garza v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 807 F. Supp. 1256, 1258 (M.D. La. 1992).  But see Griffin v. 
Dana Point Condo. Ass’n, 768 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1991).  As these cases suggest, a 
circuit split quickly developed.  Underwood, supra note 48, at 434.  The Court granted certiorari to 
address the question first in the case of Free v. Abbot Laboratories, Inc.., 529 U.S. 333 (2000), but 
Justice O’Connor’s recusal from the case led to a four-four split among the justices, leaving the 
question for another day.  See id. 
 117.  Compare Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22 (1998) (“The text is the law, and it is the text that must be 
observed.”), with STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 89–93 
(2010) (criticizing textualism and advocating an inquiry into legislative intent). 
 118.  See 28 U.S. C. § 1367 (2006) (excepting from the statute’s grant of supplemental jurisdiction 
any “claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,” which specifically leaves out Rule 23); see also Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 
567 (“The proponents of the alternative view of § 1367 insist that the statute is at least ambiguous 
and that we should look to other interpretive tools, including the legislative history of § 1367, which 
supposedly demonstrate Congress did not intend § 1367 to overrule Zahn. We can reject this 
argument at the very outset simply because § 1367 is not ambiguous.”). 
 119.  545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
 120.  See id. at 566–67. 
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more open to plaintiffs, it did not make the federal forum more desirable.121  
Nothing in the opinion made class action certification more available.122  
Rather, the holding was useful to defendants desiring to be in federal 
court.123  So long as one member of the class met the requirements of 
diversity jurisdiction, the case could be removed to a federal court with the 
power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the entire action.124  Thus, 
Congress increased the stature of removal as a tool in the corporate 
defendant’s arsenal.125 
With Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,126 the Court dealt with a purported 
class action but not with class action law.127  Rather, the question involved a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—what must a complaint allege to state a 
legally cognizable claim and survive the motion?128  In a holding that has 
been widely criticized,129 the Court held that a complaint must state on its 
face a plausible claim for relief, i.e., “[f]actual allegations . . . [sufficient] to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”130  The rule, and its 
extension in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,131 has significantly increased defendants’ 
 
 121.  The holding of Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), especially, which remains 
intact, and the perceived difficulties of getting a class certified in federal court make state courts 
more attractive. 
 122.  See generally Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 546–72. 
 123.  The usefulness of the holding is, however, limited to cases with aggregate damages under $5 
million because, of course, CAFA was passed the very next year and offers an easier means of 
removal for qualifying class actions.  See 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3704.1 (4th ed. 2006). 
 124.  See Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 558–59. 
 125.  See Underwood, supra note 48, at 432. 
 126.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 127.  See id. at 548–49. 
 128.  Id.  The complaint alleged violations of antitrust law, specifically, section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.  See id. at 548.  William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus were subscribers of local 
telecommunications companies, and represented a putative class of all fellow subscribers.  Id. at 550.  
The gist of the allegations was that competing companies in the area had agreed on inflated prices to 
the detriment of their customers.  See id. at 551–52.  The facts included in the pleading described 
“certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition” but did not include facts suggesting an actual 
agreement between the telecommunication companies involved.  Id. at 548–49.  Without such an 
agreement, parallel action does not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 552.  The Court 
ultimately held that “[b]ecause the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”  Id. at 570. 
 129.  See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (2010); Note, Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 305, 305–06 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to 
Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2007). 
 130.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original). 
 131.  556 U.S. 662 (2009) (making clear that the Twombly rule applied outside the antitrust 
context, to “all civil actions”).  The plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, sued, among others, former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, after being arrested in the tense days following the terrorist attacks on 
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probability of ending litigation at the pleading stage,132 thereby making the 
federal forum correspondingly less appealing to plaintiffs.133 
Most recently, the Supreme Court held in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes: (1) that Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement mandated a 
showing that each of the plaintiffs in the class had suffered the “same injury” 
and that the common question was central to the resolution of the action,134 
and (2) that “claims for monetary relief may [not] be certified under [Rule 
23(b)(2)].”135  Again, the case was decided on Rule 23 grounds rather than 
constitutional grounds.136  Consequently, state courts are a more attractive 
option than ever before.137 
 
September 11, 2011.  Id. at 666.  “As to [Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, the Director of the FBI], the 
complaint allege[d] that they adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected respondent to harsh 
conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.”  Id.  The Court did not 
doubt that Iqbal’s account, if true, suggested constitutional violations by his handlers.  Id.  But did 
they allege a policy dictated by Ashcroft and Muller that resulted in unconstitutional treatment?  See 
id.  Applying Twombly, the Court held that Iqbal’s “complaint fail[ed] to plead sufficient facts to 
state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination against petitioners.”  See id. at 687. 
 132.  Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 
59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 624 (2010) (“Especially after Iqbal, [courts] appear to be granting 12(b)(6) 
motions at a significantly higher rate than they did under Conley . . . .”).  In fact, in the six months 
following the Twombly decision, the case was cited in a staggering 2,400 opinions.  YEAZELL, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 45, at 364.  While the case was an antitrust case and significant portions of 
the analysis discussed the cost of discovery in such cases, see, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, “most 
of the decisions citing the case have been applying its pleading guidelines broadly to Rule 8 and 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions, regardless of the legal context.”  5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2005).  Iqbal put that question to rest, holding 
conclusively that it applied to the rule in general and not to any specific context.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 687.  
 133.  See Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A “Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 835–37 
(2008) (arguing that Twombly reflects hostility toward litigation). 
 134.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 135.  See id. at 2556. 
 136.  See Trask, supra note 91, at 327 (“[T]he Dukes certification debate was less a sweeping 
statement on due process than it was a high-profile housecleaning.”).  But see Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 
2559 (conducting an analysis under Rule 23 but then suggesting the Due Process Clause might well 
compel an identical conclusion). 
 137.  See John R. Webster & Richard C. Worf, Commonality in Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, 33 No. 1 CLASS ACTION REPORTS ART 1, Jan.-Feb. 2012 (observing that “[i]n only a few 
months, we have seen several lower court decisions in which the Dukes commonality holding 
appears to have been determinative of the outcome—that is, in which the court probably would have 
certified the class pre-Dukes, but would not certify after Dukes—directly because of a failure to 
meet commonality”).  But see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co, 130 S. Ct. 
1431 (2010).  Under Shady Grove, Rule 23’s requirements cannot be constricted by way of state 
procedural rules.  Id. at 1444.  If the class qualifies for certification under Rule 23, the inquiry ends 
there and the class is certified, regardless of any countervailing state rules of procedure.  See id.  The 
upshot is that some class actions that cannot be filed in state courts may be filed in federal courts 
instead.  See id. at 1447 (“We must acknowledge the reality that keeping the federal-court door open 
to class actions that cannot proceed in state court will produce forum shopping.”).  Thus, there is a 
narrow set of circumstances in which federal courts will not be merely more attractive to plaintiffs 
but are their only option. 
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B.  The Use of Low Ball Complaints and Stipulations to Avoid Removal: 
Three Distinct Approaches to the Problem Emerge 
In late August of 2012, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve the 
question of whether class action plaintiffs could avoid federal court and its 
body of procedural law by using binding stipulations to avoid removal under 
CAFA.138  Scantly a week later, the Court accepted the invitation,139 bringing 
CAFA to the nation’s highest court for the first time.140  The Court thus 
stands poised to solve a problem percolating among the lower courts.  Of the 
five circuit courts to encounter the issue in the CAFA context,141 four have 
 
 138.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450 (May 30, 
2012), 2012 WL 1979957; see also Ben Cheng, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 23, 2012, 
11:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/petition-of-the-day-322/.  The precise question the 
Court will answer is:  
 When a named plaintiff attempts to defeat a defendant’s right of removal under the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by filing with a class action complaint a “stipulation” 
that attempts to limit the damages he “seeks” for the absent putative class members to 
less than the $5 million threshold for federal jurisdiction, and the defendant establishes 
that the actual amount in controversy, absent the “stipulation,” exceeds $5 million, is the 
“stipulation” binding on absent class members so as to destroy federal jurisdiction? 
Supreme Court, 11-1450 Standard Fire Insurance Company v. Knowles: Question Presented (Aug. 
31, 2012), www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-01450qp.pdf. 
 139.  Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 183 L. Ed. 2d 730 (2012) (granting certiorari).  The 
case’s disposition and the lack of a well-defined circuit split on the issue prompted one court 
observer to describe the Court’s decision as “one of the most improbable grants of certiorari you will 
ever see.”  See Alison Frankel, Are Class Action Lawyers in Arkansas Snubbing SCOTUS (and 
CAFA)?, THOMSON REUTERS: NEWS & INSIGHT (Oct. 3, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuter 
s.com/Legal/News/2012/10_-_October/Are_class_action_lawyers_in_Arkansas_snubbing_SCOTUS 
_%28and_CAFA%29_/. 
 140.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450 (May 
30, 2012), 2012 WL 1979957.  Less than a year prior, the Court denied certiorari to another case 
that, like Knowles, originated in the Eighth Circuit, Skechers U.S.A. Inc. v. Tomlinson.  See 132 S. 
Ct. 551 (2011) (mem.) (denying certiorari).  In Skechers, Patty Tomlinson brought an action in 
Arkansas state court against Skechers alleging that its Shape-Ups shoes offered none of the health 
benefits claimed in advertising.  See Tomlinson v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., No. 11-5042, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 142862, at *2 (W.D. Ark. May 25, 2011).  To avoid removal under CAFA, the plaintiff 
included a binding stipulation that damages would not exceed $5 million, a stipulation that expressly 
extended to absent class members.  Id. at *5.  While the district court determined that “defendant has 
likely established by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy in this case is 
greater than $5,000,000,” the stipulation was dispositive.  Id. at *6–9. 
 141.  The question of whether, in class action litigation generally, such tactics are acceptable also 
seems to split the circuits.  Compare Darden v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 200 F.3d 753, 755–56 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (allowing stipulations to govern the amount in controversy where “all Plaintiffs 
stipulate[d] that each individual class member [would] neither request nor accept damages in excess 
of $75,000” (emphasis added)), with Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 
724 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is improbable that Manguno can ethically unilaterally waive the rights of 
the putative class members to attorney’s fees without their authorization.”).  While the legal issues 
are similar and likely should be decided in the same way, the case against dispositive stipulations is 
considerably stronger in CAFA cases because of the express purpose of the legislation to put 
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made it clear that a binding stipulation will defeat removal jurisdiction.142  
The Seventh Circuit, however, indicated that such stipulations are 
insufficient.143 
A few different theories, none of which are entirely adequate, seem to 
govern the outcomes reached thus far.  The Ninth Circuit approach seen in 
Lowdermilk comes directly from St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab 
Co.,144 and the precise question decided was what level of proof the 
defendant must satisfy to avoid remand to the state courts.145  In reaching its 
 
“interstate cases of national importance” in a federal forum.  See S. 5, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2005) 
(enacted). 
 142.  See Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[A] binding 
stipulation limiting damages sought to an amount not exceeding $5 million can be used to defeat 
CAFA jurisdiction.”); Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(dictum) (“We recognize that plaintiffs can avoid removal under CAFA by limiting the damages 
they seek to amounts less than the CAFA thresholds.”); Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 
F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2007); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 476 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006).  For a slightly 
different account of the state of the law and current circuit split, see Nick Landsman-Roos, Note, 
Front-End Fiduciaries, Pre-Certification Duties and Class Conflict, 65 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 17–20), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2155365. 
 143.  Back Doctors Ltd. v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 637 F.3d 827, 830–31 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that such stipulations could undermine the named party’s obligation to adequately represent 
the entire class).  The Fifth Circuit would likely reach the same conclusion, having dealt with a 
similar issue in the context of class actions generally.  See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 
1413 (5th Cir. 1995).  While De Aguilar seems to rely on Texas state law and does not flatly bar the 
use of binding stipulations in class actions, it has since been regularly cited for just that proposition.  
See, e.g., Ditcharo v. UPS, 376 F. App’x 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[The purported stipulation] 
do[es] not provide Appellants with the authority to deny other members of their putative class action 
the right to seek an award greater than $ 75,000.”); Manguno, 276 F.3d at 724 (“[I]t is improbable 
that Manguno can ethically unilaterally waive the rights of the putative class members to attorney’s 
fees without their authorization.”); Belin v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 11-0215, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
69449, at *7 (W.D. La. June 28, 2011) (“[A]lthough the class representatives appear willing to waive 
their own claims for damages in excess of the jurisdictional threshold, they do not have authority to 
waive damages on behalf of other unnamed class members.”); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 8, Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Tomlinson, 132 S.Ct. 551 (2011) (No. 11–287), 2011 WL 3898017 
(citing several previously identified cases in support of the proposition that the Seventh and Fifth 
Circuits had both reached the conclusion that binding stipulations are impermissible in CAFA 
litigation).  But see Coltrin v. Rain CII Carbon, L.L.C., No. 2:09-CV-837, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7905, at *6 (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2012) (“Plaintiffs can [defeat removal] by filing a pre-removal 
binding stipulation, or affidavit, affirmatively renouncing their right to accept a judgment in excess 
of $75,000.00.”  (citing De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412)).  Coltrin demonstrates that the Fifth Circuit’s 
position on binding stipulations remains unclear.  
 144.  303 U.S. 283 (1938). 
 145.  Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 995–96.  The very first sentence of the opinion illustrates that this 
case is, in actuality, a case about a lowball complaint:  “[W]hen the plaintiff has pled damages less 
than the jurisdictional amount, what must the defendant prove in order to remove the case to federal 
court?”  Id. at 996.  While the differences between a lowball complaint and a stipulation are 
significant, in jurisdictions where pleadings are nearly dispositive, a lowball complaint gives the 
plaintiff the best of both worlds—the case stays in state court, and the plaintiff is free to seek 
whatever damages it can get.  The case involved a class of U.S. Bank employees represented by 
Willene Lowdermilk.  Id.  They alleged that the bank had violated a pair of Oregon laws governing 
the payment of employees and brought the action in state court.  Id.  The relief requested was “in 
total, less than five million dollars,” and the complaint’s jurisdictional statement provided that “[t]he 
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conclusion, the court relied on two principles.  First, being of limited 
jurisdiction, federal courts should “strictly construe [their] jurisdiction.”146  
Second, the plaintiff is entitled to avoid federal jurisdiction by way of 
pleading.147  With these principles established, the result became nearly 
inevitable.  The court cited St. Paul in support of the proposition that “a 
plaintiff may sue for less than the amount she may be entitled to if she 
wishes to avoid federal jurisdiction and remain in state court.”148  With only 
the qualification that there could be no “bad faith” on the part of the 
plaintiff, the court held that merely pleading—not even necessarily 
stipulating—that damages would be less than the jurisdictional amount put 
the burden on the defendant to show to a “legal certainty” that the damages 
would exceed the jurisdictional minimum before blocking remand.149 
In the previous year, the Third Circuit panel in Morgan v. Gay seemed 
to use much the same approach in reaching much the same conclusion.150  
Among the differences, the most important was the court’s forward-looking 
observation that an ultimate award of damages in excess of $5 million, while 
allowed under both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and New Jersey’s 
analogous body of rules,151 “could well be deemed prejudicial to the party 
that sought removal to federal court when the party seeking remand uses a 
damages-limitation provision to avoid federal court.”152 
 
aggregate total of the claims pled herein do not exceed five million dollars.”  Id. (alteration in 
original).  When the defendant removed, contending “that the actual amount in controversy far 
exceeded CAFA’s jurisdictional amount,” the district court promptly remanded the case back to the 
Oregon state court, holding “that it was bound by the complaint as to the amount in controversy 
‘unless plaintiff's prayer is determined to have been made in bad faith,’” and that the defendant had 
not proven bad faith on the part of the plaintiff.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit granted the defendant 
permission to appeal and transmuted the district court’s good faith requirement into the legal 
certainty test.  Id. at 1005 (“[T]he ‘legal certainty,’ or ‘good faith,’ test from St Paul Mercury is 
applicable where the complaint at issue specifies an amount in controversy lower than the 
jurisdictional minimum, not where the complaint fails to specify what the amount in controversy 
is.”). 
 146.  Id. at 998. 
 147.  Id. at 998–99. 
 148.  See id. at 999. 
 149.  See id. 
 150.  Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473–76 (3d. Cir. 2006).  Like Lowdermilk, this case involved 
a lowball complaint.  See id. at 471 (quoting from the complaint: “the total amount of such monetary 
relief for the class as a whole shall not exceed $5 million in sum or value” (citing Morgan v. Gay, 
No. 06-1371, 2006 WL 2265302 at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7,2006)).  Upon removal by the defendant, the 
district court determined that the minimum jurisdictional amount had not been met and remanded the 
case.  Id.  After applying the same “legal certainty” standard and ordering remand, the panel 
observed that “[t]he plaintiff has made her choice, and the plaintiffs in state court who choose not to 
opt out of the class must live with it.”  Id. at 477–78. 
 151.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c); N.J. CT. R. 4:42-6. 
 152.  See Morgan, 471 F.3d at 477.  In its conclusion, the court elaborated:  
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In the Eighth Circuit, there are no varying standards of proof depending 
on the pleading; the defendant need show only by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the various jurisdictional requirements are met.153  The court 
noted in Bell v. Hershey Co. that use of the “legal certainty” test in CAFA 
cases both conflicts with a primary purpose of CAFA—”to open the federal 
courts to corporate defendants out of concern that the national economy 
risked damage from a proliferation of meritless class action suits”—and 
represents an inversion of the test as applied by the Supreme Court in St. 
Paul.154  Then, unnecessarily, the court made the offhand remark that trouble 
could have been avoided in the first place by stipulating to damages less than 
 
We do caution, however, that the plaintiffs in state court should not be permitted to 
ostensibly limit their damages to avoid federal court only to receive an award in excess of 
the federal amount in controversy requirement.  The plaintiff has made her choice, and 
the plaintiffs in state court who choose not to opt out of the class must live with it. 
Id. at 477–78. 
  A later decision construing Morgan described its place in Third Circuit approaches to CAFA 
cases: 
 Morgan provided a more complete roadmap.  First, it added a precept that may be 
applied to all diversity class actions that have been removed: “Because ‘the complaint 
may be silent or ambiguous on one or more of the ingredients needed to calculate the 
amount in controversy,’ ‘[a] defendant’s notice of removal serves the same functions as 
the complaint would in a suit filed in federal court.’”  Second, Morgan erected guideposts 
in those cases where the plaintiff’s complaint specifically and precisely states that the 
amount sought in a class action diversity complaint “for the class as a whole shall not 
exceed $5 million in sum or value.”  In such cases “[t]he party wishing to establish 
subject matter jurisdiction has the burden to prove by a legal certainty that the amount in 
controversy exceeds the statutory threshold.” 
Raspa v. Home Depot, 533 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 (D.N.J. 2007) (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted).   
 153.  Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 957–58 (8th. Cir. 2009) (requiring that the defendant 
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the jurisdictional requirements are met, noting that—
under St Paul—the plaintiff has the prerogative to limit the amount in controversy, and that only 
“good faith” in pleading is required). 
 154.  See id. (noting that St. Paul held that where the plaintiff’s pleadings showed to a legal 
certainty that the jurisdictional minimum had not been reached, the pleadings would be dispositive).  
An antitrust case, James Bell brought suit against five chocolate manufacturers alleging, inter alia, 
price fixing.  Id. at 954–55.  As the district court noted, great pains were made when drafting the 
complaint to circumvent CAFA.  Id. at 955.  Bell’s attorneys were not the sort to beat around the 
bush, and the complaint read in part: “[T]he Class Action Fairness Act does not apply and no federal 
court jurisdiction is available as a basis for removal.”  Id.  While the class certainly qualified for 
removal under CAFA in all other respects, the petition purported to limit the amount in controversy 
to $3.75 million in compensatory damages and “no more than $1.24 million” in attorney’s fees—a 
grand total of $4.99 million.  Id.  Rather than sheer luck or fancifulness, the class was composed 
with CAFA in mind and designed to avoid it.  See id. (“Bell arrived at a figure below the 
jurisdictional minimum through permissible control of the class composition, the assumed price 
fixing overcharge, and the duration of the class period.”).  Additionally, in pleading specific 
damages, Bell flaunted Iowa court rules, which prohibit the practice.  Id.; see also IOWA R. CIV. P. 
1.403(1) (“[A] pleading shall not state the specific amount of money damages sought. . . . The 
specific amount and elements of monetary damages sought may be obtained through discovery.”).  
The district court applied a legal certainty test and remanded, but after electing to allow the 
interlocutory appeal, the Eight Circuit vacated and remanded.  Bell, 557 F.3d at 959. 
KILLIAN-SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2012  10:23 AM 
[Vol. 40: 111, 2012] An Illusion of Sacrifice 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
137 
the jurisdictional minimum.155  District courts have, understandably, attached 
great significance to this passage,156 turning Bell into a “roadmap” for 
circumventing CAFA.157 
Knowles v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. represents a paradigm 
example.158  The case tackled the very problem of this Comment: “whether a 
plaintiff may meet his burden of proof by stipulating at the time the 
complaint is filed that he will not seek more than the federal jurisdictional 
minimum for himself and the putative class.”159  After determining that the 
defendant had met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the amount in controversy was more than $5 million, the burden then 
shifted to the plaintiff to prove to a legal certainty that it would not recover 
 
 155.  See id. at 958 (“In order to ensure that any attempt to remove would have been unsuccessful, 
Bell could have included a binding stipulation with his petition stating that he would not seek 
damages greater than the jurisdictional minimum upon remand; it is too late to do so now.”).   
  Dictum is often and fairly criticized because it is essentially an advisory opinion operating 
outside the context of an Article III case or controversy.  See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 
51, 69 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring) (“A judge’s power to bind is limited to the issue 
that is before him; he cannot transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and uttering the word 
‘hold’.”).  While Judge Murphy’s pronouncement here was entirely avoidable—she had already 
issued the holding, see Bell, 557 F.3d at 958—dicta is often unavoidable and not intended to be 
followed.  See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1250 (2006) (describing dicta as a “judge’s insignificant aside remark—something to be 
treated lightly, or frankly, ignored”).  As Judge Leval points out, ultimately, “[w]hat is problematic 
is not the utterance of dicta, but the failure to distinguish between holding and dictum.”  Id. at 1253. 
 156.  See Thompson v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-03009-PKH, 2011 WL 2671312, at *2 (W.D. 
Ark. July 8, 2011) (“[N]umerous federal district courts . . . have set forth compelling reasoning in 
ruling that stipulations following the procedure outlined in Bell are sufficient to defeat diversity 
jurisdiction under CAFA.”); see also Tomlinson v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., No. 11–5042, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 142862, at *8 (W.D. Ark. May 25, 2011); Murphy v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., No. 4:11-CV-
214-DPM, 2011 WL 1559234, at *2–*3 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 22, 2011); Tuberville v. New Balance 
Athletic Shoe, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-01016, 2011 WL 1527716, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 21, 2011). 
 157.  Tuberville, 2011 WL 1527716, at *2. (“[Bell] provides a roadmap for a CAFA plaintiff to 
follow to avoid removal to federal court.”). 
 158.  No. 4:11–CV–04044, 2011 WL 6013024 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 2, 2011), cert. granted, 183 L. 
Ed. 2d 730 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 11-1450).  The case sounded in contract law.  Id. at *1.  The 
plaintiff, Greg Knowles, alleged that Standard Fire Insurance Company had systematically 
underpaid on insurance claims.  Id.  Counsel for Knowles employed two tactics in order to 
preemptively defeat removal—confining the class to a two-year period instead of the five allowed by 
the statute of limitations and signing a stipulation that damages greater than $5 million would not be 
sought.  Id.  After removing, the defendant adduced evidence sufficient to show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the $5 million jurisdictional amount was met by a slim margin, less than 
$25,000.  Id. at *3.  Indeed, because the amount in controversy established was $5,024,150, id., this 
case may well be one of the few in which the stipulation does not represent inadequate 
representation—the probability of winning is improved and recovery goes down only fractionally, 
see infra Part V.C.2.c.  However, because Knowles follows Bell and does not tackle the issue 
independently in any meaningful way, it is a model example of the binding stipulation at work in the 
Eighth Circuit. 
 159.  Knowles,  2011 WL 6013024, at *4. 
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such a sum.160  The court began its analysis with a clear statement of the 
rule: “The law in this circuit is clear that a binding stipulation sworn by a 
plaintiff in a purported class action will bar removal from state court if the 
stipulation limits damages to the state jurisdictional minimum.”161  Because 
the plaintiffs had effectively stipulated that they would “seek to recover total 
aggregate damages of less than” $5 million, the burden had been met and 
remand was proper.162 
After three years spent paving the Bell map’s road, the dictum became 
Eighth Circuit law in 2011, with nary a meaningful analysis.163  Rather than 
the result of a discussion, the holding came as part of a rule statement in 
Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc.: 
We have previously stated that a binding stipulation limiting 
damages sought to an amount not exceeding $5 million can be used 
to defeat CAFA jurisdiction.  Stipulations of this sort, when filed 
contemporaneously with a plaintiff’s complaint and not after 
removal, have long been recognized as a method of defeating 
federal jurisdiction in the non-CAFA context.164 
This both illustrates and misses the point.  Dicta and inapposite case law 
should not have settled the question.165  Thus, despite being fully briefed on 
the defendant’s fiduciary duty arguments,166 the Eighth Circuit treated the 
question as closed and relied on the rule that the court is “bound to consider 
only jurisdictional facts present at the time of removal and not those 
occurring subsequently,” turning what should have been an open question of 
 
 160.  Id. at *3–4. 
 161.  Id. at *4.  This disconcerting conflation of dicta with law is precisely what Judge Leval of 
the Second Circuit addressed in his 2006 article.  See Leval, supra note 155.   
 162.  Id. at *2, *4, *6. 
 163.  See Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2012).  Rolwing 
involved a merger between Nestle and Ralston Purina Company.  See id. at 1070.  Upon completion 
of the merger, a Ralston shareholder sued, alleging on behalf of a putative class of fellow 
shareholders that Nestle had paid them late, thus entitling them to six days of interest.  Id.  The 
prayer for relief included an ironclad binding stipulation, both requesting “judgment against 
defendant in an amount that is fair and reasonable in excess of $25,000, but not to exceed 
$4,999,999” and providing, “Plaintiff and the class do not seek—and will not accept—any recovery 
of damages (in the form of statutory interest) and any other relief, in total, in excess of $4,999,999.”  
Id. at 1071.  Additionally, the complaint included a pair of stipulations to the same effect, one signed 
by counsel and the other by the single lead plaintiff.  Id.  The defendant’s first contention, that 
Missouri law would not give effect to the stipulation, was rejected on state law grounds—Missouri’s 
judicial estoppel doctrine would preclude the plaintiff from accepting damages greater than $5 
million.  See id. at 1072.   
 164.  Id. (citation omitted).  
 165.  Cf., e.g., J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 773 
(1987) (“[D]istinguishing a case is as much an interpretation as following it.”). 
 166.  See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 11–23, Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069 
(8th Cir. 2012) (No. 11–3445), 2011 WL 6073918 at *11–23. 
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statutory interpretation into a fact-bound jurisdictional analysis.167  Rolwing 
seemed to foreclose hope for any successful appeal in Knowles, and the 
Eighth Circuit indeed denied discretionary review168 and a rehearing en 
banc,169 thus making the case ripe for Supreme Court review. 
In the Sixth Circuit the same pattern occurred.  Unnecessary dicta in a 
circuit court decision170 is now regarded as the law of the circuit.171  The 
question has not been analyzed in any depth, and the dicta has become 
another roadmap for defeating CAFA.172 
While each of these analytical approaches is compelling so far as they 
go, it is where they do not go that raises concern.  Unlike its sister circuits, 
when faced with a similar question, the Seventh Circuit analysis looks at the 
question not simply as one of diversity jurisdiction but also in light of class 
action requirements generally.173  Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to serve as a representative member of a class, the named 
party must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”174  In 
Back Doctors Ltd. v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 
 
 167.  See Rolwing, 666 F.3d at 1073. 
 168.  Knowles v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 11-8030, 2012 WL 3828891 (8th Cir. Jan. 4, 2012) 
(denying permission to appeal). 
 169.  Knowles v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 11-8030, 2012 WL 3828845 (8th Cir. Mar. 1, 2012) 
(denying petition for rehearing en banc and panel rehearing). 
 170.  See Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2008).  In 
Freeman, the plaintiff had attempted to evade CAFA by bringing five different class actions, all 
based on the same alleged tort and maintaining that the amount in controversy for any given plaintiff 
was less than $75,000 and that the class-wide claim was limited to $4.9 million.  Id. at 407.  The 
Sixth Circuit panel made an inquiry into legislative intent and held that CAFA’s “purposes support 
reading CAFA not to permit the splintering of lawsuits solely to avoid federal jurisdiction in the 
fashion done in this case.”  Id. at 408.  Because “recovery [wa]s expanded, rather than limited, by 
virtue of splintering of lawsuits for no colorable reason,” the individual actions were not treated as 
containing stipulated damages.  Id. at 409.  This certainly makes sense.  Otherwise, the plaintiffs 
would get all the benefits of a stipulation while the defendant would still be liable for a huge sum.  
However, the court’s decision to cite St. Paul and “recognize” the plaintiff’s right to use a binding 
stipulation to defeat removal was unfortunate dictum not necessary to the holding.  See id.  
 171.  See, e.g., Franklin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-608, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 270, at *6 
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2012) (“A plaintiff who wants to avoid federal jurisdiction may do so by attaching 
a binding stipulation to his complaint limiting damages to an amount below the applicable 
jurisdictional threshold.”); McClendon v. Challenge Fin. Investors Corp., No. 1:11 CV 1597, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128178, at *14 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2011) (noting “the recognition by the Sixth 
Circuit . . . that a class representative can avoid CAFA jurisdiction by expressly limiting the class 
members’ damages”). 
 172.  See McClendon, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *15 (holding that, because the plaintiff “has 
done what the Sixth Circuit says she has the right to do: limit the total potential damage award to 
less than $5,000,000 to litigate her case in state court,” remand was proper).  
 173.  See Back Doctors Ltd. v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 637 F.3d 827, 830–31 (7th Cir. 
2011).   
 174.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
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instead of a binding stipulation, there was only an in-court declaration that 
the plaintiff did not “‘now’ want punitive damages,” a declaration relied on 
by the district court in remanding the case.175  This non-binding language 
readily suggests one problem with the remand.  Regardless of which circuit 
the case appeared in, “events after the date of removal do not affect federal 
jurisdiction, and this means in particular that a declaration by the plaintiff 
following removal does not permit remand.”176  Writing for a unanimous 
panel, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook went further.177  Because of the 
representative party’s duty to its class, he wrote, any purported limitation on 
the damages sought would be subject to review.178  It necessarily followed 
that: 
A representative can’t throw away what could be a major 
component of the class’s recovery.  Either a state or a federal judge 
might insist that some other person, more willing to seek punitive 
damages, take over as representative.  What Back Doctors is willing 
to accept thus does not bind the class and therefore does not ensure 
that the stakes fall under $5 million.179 
 
 175.  See Back Doctors Ltd., 637 F.3d at 830.  In Back Doctors, the plaintiff sued in an Illinois 
state court, alleging that the defendant, an insurance provider, was violating both contractual duties 
and an Illinois statute by utilizing software enabling them to pay medical providers less than 
required by the underlying policies.  Id. at 829.  The insurance provider timely removed to federal 
court under CAFA, and Back Doctors requested that the case be remanded to state court.  Id.  While 
damages in excess of $2.9 million were apparent, the insurer argued that the looming specter of 
punitive damages meant the amount actually in controversy exceeded $5 million.  Id.   
 176.  Id. at 830.  Ironically, this rule also finds its origins in St. Paul.  See St. Paul Mercury Indem. 
Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 290–92 (1938). 
 177.  In all fairness, this “holding” is probably itself dictum.  As Judge Leval notes, the distinction 
between the two comes not from how the proposition is framed by the court but rather whether it is 
central to the holding.  See Leval, supra note 155, at 1257–58.  Judge Easterbrook provides two 
seemingly equally weighted reasons why remand is improper—the St. Paul issue of timing and the 
plaintiff’s “fiduciary duty” to her fellow class members.  Back Doctors Ltd., 637 F.3d at 830–31.  
The first reason seems to be the central holding while the second is not necessary even if true.  This 
fits Judge Leval’s definition of dicta.  See Leval, supra note 155, at 1257 (“If the insertion of the 
rejected proposition into the court’s reasoning, in place of the one adopted, would not require a 
change in either the court’s judgment or the reasoning that supports it, then the proposition is dictum. 
It is superfluous. It had no functional role in compelling the judgment.”).  Whether it represents 
dictum could probably be persuasively argued both ways, and luckily the correct answer, pointed out 
only to give a fair accounting of the state of the law, is of no importance to this Comment. 
 178.  Back Doctors Ltd., 637 F.3d at 830–31. 
 179.  Id.  The same logic can be seen in a Fifth Circuit case predating the passage of CAFA.  In 
Manguno v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 276 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 2002), the court 
considered whether remand was required in a class action case where the plaintiffs included in their 
petition a statement that “the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000” and that the plaintiffs 
were not seeking attorneys fees allowed by Louisiana law.  See Manguno, 276 F.3d at 722.  
However, because under Louisiana law, the plaintiff receives whatever relief their case merits, 
regardless of whether it was included in the prayer or relief, and because the purported waiver of 
fees was in no way binding, a determination that the aggregated legal fees would be in excess of 
$75,000 was sufficient to prevent remand.  Id.  at 724.  Only in dicta did the court observe that it was 
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Judge Easterbrook’s analysis hints at the fundamental flaw in relying 
primarily on St. Paul.  While the seminal case undoubtedly remains good 
law, not only was it decided sixty-seven years before CAFA,180 but it was 
also not a class action case.181  It involved a single plaintiff and, originally, 
two defendants.182  The specter of Rule 23 changes the analysis.183 
IV.  CATALOGING THE MYRIAD PROBLEMS CREATED BY STIPULATIONS 
As seen in Part III.B, federal judges have been loathe to undermine 
concepts of plaintiff autonomy and confine St. Paul Mercury to similar 
cases.184  In doing so, courts consistently give short shrift to the problems 
identified by defendants’ counsel.185  In this Part, full treatment is given to 
those problems, which manifest themselves on three planes.  Subsection A 
examines the tensions between binding stipulations and the law, first with 
specific regard to Rule 23,186 then in relation to CAFA itself,187 and, finally, 
developing case law on claim splitting, a common practice that has recently 
 
“improbable that Manguno [could] ethically unilaterally waive the rights of the putative class 
members to attorney’s fees without their authorization.”  Id.   
 180.  Compare St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. 283, with Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  Additionally, it 
was decided 28 years before the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
fundamentally altering Rule 23 and creating class actions as we know them today.  See Note, 
Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 HARV. L. REV. 619, 619 n.1 (1986) (“The 
modern class action dates from 1966, when the Supreme Court promulgated an amended rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 181.  See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 284.  St. Paul was, essentially, a run-of-the-
mill insurance dispute.  See id. at 284–85.  When the case was removed to federal court, the 
complaint was amended twice, and the second amended complaint revealed the damages to be less 
than the minimum jurisdictional amount.  Id. at 285.  The district court then rendered a judgment for 
the plaintiffs on the merits, which on appeal, the circuit court declined to address, observing that, 
from the face of the second amended complaint, the court had no jurisdiction.  Id.  Thus, the precise 
issue was whether a complaint amended after removal could deprive the court of jurisdiction, a 
question the Court answered in the negative.  See id. at 294–95.  The disposition of the case creates 
another, smaller, problem with relying on St. Paul to answer this CAFA question: that the plaintiff 
could “resort to the expedient of suing for less than the jurisdictional amount” thereby stripping the 
defendant of his right to remove the action was mere dicta.  Id. at 294; see supra note 155 
(discussing dicta and the problems with its use); see also infra Part V.C.2 (discussing St. Paul in 
greater depth). 
 182.  See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 284–86.  Subsequently, the district court 
dismissed the second defendant, making the case one featuring a single plaintiff and a single 
defendant by the time it reached the Supreme Court.  See id. 
 183.  See infra Part V.C.2.a. 
 184.  Supra notes 138–83 and accompanying text. 
 185.  See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text; infra notes 337–61 and accompanying text. 
 186.  See infra notes 192–206 and accompanying text. 
 187.  See infra notes 207–261 and accompanying text. 
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attracted the attention of the Supreme Court.188  Subsection B discusses the 
constitutional justifications for CAFA and concludes that binding 
stipulations undermine the federalist structure enshrined in the Constitution.  
Finally, Subsection C draws on lessons learned from the study of complex 
litigation, which is concerned largely with consistency and efficiency.189  By 
funneling large cases into the federal forum, CAFA operates as an important 
complex litigation tool, and its circumvention promotes inefficiency and 
inconsistency.190  These considerations make binding stipulations unfit in the 
class action context, a conclusion highlighted by a close inquiry into St. Paul 
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.191 
A.  A Question of Class Action Law: Understanding the Interplay Between 
Stipulations and Rule 23 
1.  The Struggle Between Stipulated Damages and General 
Requirements for Class Actions 
The general requirements for class action certification are known 
informally as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation.192  Numerosity, commonality, and typicality are not 
threatened by permitting stipulated limitations of damages, but as Judge 
Easterbrook observed, the adequacy of the representation becomes suspect 
once the potential damages have been capped under $5 million.193 
While the text of Rule 23 mandates only that “the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,”194 that same 
obligation necessarily falls on the shoulders of the plaintiffs’ attorneys.195  
 
 188.  See infra notes 262–77 and accompanying text. 
 189.  See infra notes 297–304 and accompanying text. 
 190.  See infra notes 305–17 and accompanying text. 
 191.  See infra notes 318–36 and accompanying text. 
 192.  YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 45, at 799; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  In its 
entirety, Rule 23(a) reads: 
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all members only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  
 193.  See Back Doctors Ltd. v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 637 F.3d 827, 830–31 (7th Cir. 
2011).  
 194.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
 195.  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997) (noting that 
“competency and conflicts of class counsel” should be considered as part of the inquiry into whether 
the class will be adequately represented).  Indeed, it has been argued persuasively that the 
importance of adequate class representatives pales in comparison to that of adequate class counsel.  
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While the rules recognize a right of absentee class members to adequate 
representation,196 the possible lack of a remedy demonstrates that such class 
members must be protected on the front-end of the process—at 
certification—rather than at the back-end—on appeal—at which point it may 
be too late to collaterally attack any judgment binding them or cutting off 
their rights for future recovery.197  Furthermore, the inquiry into each of the 
 
See Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in Class 
Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 165 (1990) (arguing that the “class representative serves no useful 
purpose and that we would be better off without him”). 
  The adequacy requirement with regard to class counsel was codified with the 2003 
amendments to Rule 23.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the class.”).  Notwithstanding the particularized provision, courts tend to 
apply Rule 23(a)(4) to counsel just as they did before the amendments.  See, e.g., Creative 
Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear L.L.C., 662 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing both 
(a)(4) and (g) as relevant where “class counsel ha[d] demonstrated a lack of integrity that cast[] 
serious doubt on their trustworthiness as representatives of the class”); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the adequacy of “the named plaintiffs and their 
counsel” under only Rule 23(a)(4)).  For this reason, and because the language in (a)(4) and (g)(4) 
substantially mirror each other, this Comment will cite to (a)(4), but it should be understood that 
(g)(4) is also implicated. 
 196.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).  It is important to note that Rule 23 does not create such a right.  
Rather, the provision is written with an eye toward the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee.  
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 1183, 1192 (1982) (“Rule 23’s mandate of adequate representation is of constitutional 
dimension. In essence, this requirement embodies a fundamental tenet of due process: that judicial 
procedure fairly protect ‘the interest of absent parties who are to be bound by it.’” (quoting 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940))); 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE § 1765 (3d ed. 2005) (“The binding effect of all class-action decrees raises substantial 
due-process questions that are directly relevant to Rule 23(a)(4).”). 
 197.  See Koniak, supra, note 49, at 1787–93.  Professor Koniak’s article was inspired by the 
Supreme Court’s decision, or lack thereof, in Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 
(2003), in which an evenly divided court affirmed by default the Second Circuit’s position that 
absent class members can challenge the preclusive effects of an earlier judgment on the grounds of 
inadequate representation.  See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Because these plaintiffs were inadequately represented in the prior litigation, they were not proper 
parties and cannot be bound by the settlement.”).  The Ninth Circuit, however, has held otherwise.  
See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he absent class members’ due 
process right to adequate representation is protected not by collateral review, but by the certifying 
court initially, and thereafter by appeal within the state system and by direct review in the United 
States Supreme Court.”). 
  These considerations create another, more ironic, reason for defendants to contest binding 
stipulations—repose.  In settling, the defendant “seeks to purchase” finality.  Nagareda, 
Administering Adequacy, supra note 47, at 289.  However, if the settlement is found constitutionally 
wanting due to inadequate representation, it could conceivably be attacked collaterally, at which 
point the defendant would again be exposed to liability.  See supra note 49 (discussing the viability 
of such an attack).  Therefore, for true finality, defendants have an interest in making sure that absent 
plaintiffs in actions against them are afforded due process.  To pile irony on irony, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have no such enduring concerns for absent class members; they merely need to pass a 
rarely failed test once.  Cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate 
Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2004) 
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Rule 23(a) factors is to be “rigorous,” a description that makes probing, 
nuanced analysis not only proper but required.198 
Of course, Rule 23 and its various protections apply only to cases in 
federal court.199  This creates a situation where Judge Easterbrook’s 
argument is arguably beside the point—if the case is to be remanded to state 
court, of what concern is it that it would fail to meet Rule 23’s requirements?  
However, the adequacy requirement’s constitutional underpinnings make the 
consideration of adequacy relevant in any forum.200  Further, CAFA’s 
provisions should be read in pari materia201 with Rule 23, and a tactic 
 
(“Instead, courts routinely wave their blessings over class counsel and proposed class representatives 
and presumptively make findings of adequacy on nonexistent or scant factual showings.”). 
 198.  See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).  Federal courts at all levels, 
including the Supreme Court itself, have latched onto the requirement that class actions be certified 
after only a “rigorous” application of Rule 23(a), with over 1500 such cases citing General 
Telephone Co. for that proposition.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 
(2011); Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24, 29 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Faulk v. Home Oil Co., 184 F.R.D. 645, 649 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
 199.  See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2377–78 (2011) (acknowledging and giving 
deference to the fact that “the West Virginia Supreme Court has . . . declar[ed] its independence 
from federal courts’ interpretation of the Federal Rules—and particularly of Rule 23”). 
 200.  See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789.1 
(3d ed. 2005).  The requirements of the due process clause apply identically in state and federal 
courts meaning that any state’s version of the adequacy of representation prong must, at a minimum, 
meet the constitutional requirement.  See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 
909, 919 (Tex. 2010) (enumerating Texas’s class action requirements of numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation, and observing that the “protections are not only 
procedural safeguards but are based in the Due Process clauses of the United States . . . .”); cf. 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806–12 (1985) (analyzing the class action rules of 
Kansas against the backdrop of the Constitution’s due process guarantee and finding them 
satisfactory). 
 201.  Translated, the phrase means “[o]n the same subject; relating to the same matter.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009).  “It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari 
materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking 
at another statute on the same subject.”  Id.  While reliance on canons of statutory construction is 
admittedly fraught, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) 
(“[T]here are two opposing canons on almost every point.”), the canon discussed here has gained 
wide acceptance on the Supreme Court, being cited in over 300 opinions (including concurrences 
and dissents).  See, e.g., Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs. Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007) 
(reading provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1447 “in pari materia”); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 
(2003) (“And it is, of course, the most rudimentary rule of statutory construction . . . that courts do 
not interpret statutes in isolation, but in the context of the corpus juris of which they are a part, 
including later-enacted statutes.”) (citing United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How) 556, 564–65 
(1845) (“The correct rule of interpretation is, that if divers statutes relate to the same thing, they 
ought all to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of 
law, that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law.  If a thing 
contained in a subsequent statute, be within the reason of a former statute, it shall be taken to be 
within the meaning of that statute; and if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari 
materia, what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, they will amount to 
a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.” 
(citations omitted))). 
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violative of the latter should not be permitted under the former.202 
While the effect of Rule 23 has been to constrict class action 
certification, this is not its purpose.203  The relevant purpose of Rule 23 is to 
ensure that classes get certified only where proper.204  Rule 23, then, does 
not derive its value from its limiting effects but from the quality of classes it 
produces.205  A tactic rendering the class action constitutionally suspect 
 
 202.  Cf., e.g., Grimsdale v. Kash N’ Karry Food Stores, Inc. (In re Hannaford Bros. Co. 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 564 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The most natural reading of the 
home state exception is that Congress meant § 1332(d)(4)(B) to be read in conjunction with . . . 
[Rule 23] or similar state statutes and rules of judicial procedure.”). 
 203.  See Nagareda, The Administrative State, supra note 50, at 625 (“Class certification . . . is all 
about the legitimacy of the assertion that the proposed aggregate unit is an appropriate unit for 
inquiry.”). 
 204.  See id. 
 205.  Critics of CAFA do not seem to address this argument.  While the legislation is derided as 
being pro-defendant (and therefore pro-big business), the only virtue of state courts seems to be that 
plaintiffs have a better win-rate in state court.  See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 43, at 93–95 (recounting 
various criticism of state courts and recasting them as myths but providing, at best, only a probative 
lack of evidence to support the conclusion); Kanner, supra note 39 (citing “federal courts’ reluctance 
to issue class certification” as illustrative of the point that CAFA denies plaintiffs their day in court 
without acknowledging that class action certification is tantamount to victory).  The other primary 
argument, plaintiff autonomy, seems unmoored from reality for two reasons.  First, absentee class 
members make up the vast majority of any given class and have no autonomy at all.  See Jay 
Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1149–50 (2009); see also 
supra note 196–97 and accompanying text.  Second, the autonomy at stake belongs not to the named 
representatives but rather to their counsel in these lawyer-dominated proceedings.  See Howard M. 
Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective 
Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 524 [hereinafter Erichson, Beyond the Class Action] 
(“In a class action, numerous plaintiffs depend upon the work of counsel with whom they have no 
meaningful individual lawyer-client relationship, [and] over whom they have no meaningful 
control . . . .”).  Increased discussion on what makes state courts qualitatively better in how they deal 
with class actions would be valuable but seems lacking.  But see 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (3d ed. 2009) (observing that, at least “in some 
parts of the country” the argument that “federal courts qualitatively are so superior to the state courts 
that it is desirable to channel as many cases as possible to those tribunals, or at least that out-of-state 
litigants who have no opportunity to work for the improvement of the state courts, should be spared 
exposure to them” has merit).  From these observations it follows that opponents of CAFA could 
more readily be described as pro-plaintiff or anti-big business.  That plaintiffs win more often in 
state court is no justification for the normative proposition that they should have an easier time 
staying there.  The argument that defendants are more likely to be held accountable in state court is 
beside the point, or worse, if not grounded in sound arguments that the states have developed better 
models of producing justice.  Observations that CAFA is, in any event, not inherently pro-defendant 
leads to an obvious conclusion:  
Objections that CAFA is pro-defendant may also be overtaken by future events. . . . 
[C]urrent preferences may change.  Indeed, one could even make an argument that in the 
long run CAFA will inure to the benefit of consumer plaintiffs.  Certainly the legislation 
includes a stated endorsement for class actions on behalf of consumers; by making 
federal court jurisdiction more readily available for such suits, it may enable litigation of 
exactly the sort that defense interests would not welcome.  Moreover, should it also 
produce a shift away from either Erie or Klaxon, CAFA would become a more potent 
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under Rule 23 should not be endorsed by federal courts.206 
2.  How Permitting Stipulated Damages Undermines the Very 
Foundations of CAFA, Both as a Provider of “Fairness” and as 
a Congressional Tool Ensuring National Issues Are Dealt with 
at the Federal Level 
Depending on who is doing the talking, one referring to CAFA by its 
full name, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, will always say fairness 
with an entirely straight face or a hint of irony.  The question fairness to 
whom has been bandied about ad nauseum by commentators, practitioners, 
and politicians alike.207 
While CAFA doubtless seems unfair to plaintiffs’ attorneys, it only 
endeavored to be fair to the actual plaintiffs on one hand and defendants on 
the other.208  Its success in achieving these competing goals can be debated, 
 
instrument for such suits.  Thus, although some supporters of the legislation regard it as a 
step toward curtailing private enforcement of public law, the statute could boomerang 
against them. 
Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra note 40, at 1789 (citations omitted); see also PURCELL, 
LITIGATION & INEQUALITY, supra note 36, at viii (noting that “the social impact of procedural and 
jurisdictional rules changes over time”). 
 206.  Indeed, federal rules governing class actions have led the way for states, which have in large 
part enacted analogous provisions.  See Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra note 40, at 1797; 
TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 342; see, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 42.  The difference 
between state procedural law and federal procedural law is often mere accident, and states, while 
they might always trail the federal law because they are tracking it, generally make course 
corrections as suggested by their counterparts on the federal bench.  See David Marcus, Erie, The 
Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1247, 1294–95 (2007) [hereinafter Marcus, Federalism Implications] (describing 
various abuses to prove the need for CAFA and the remedial steps taken by the individual states in 
the intervening time since).  In fact, several of the state court practices condemned when CAFA was 
enacted have been largely curtailed by the states themselves.  Id.; Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, 
supra note 40, at 1798 (describing California’s new proactive stance on coupon settlements).  If state 
courts are only better for plaintiffs because they are less experienced and sophisticated with regard to 
complex litigation, the idea that this alternative forum should be protected is substantially weakened.  
See id. 
 207.  See, e.g., Editorial, Class-Action Unfairness, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), June 21, 2004, 
at 06A, available at 2004 WLNR 21215023; Michael Isaac Miller, Comment, The Class Action 
(Un)Fairness Act of 2005: Could It Spell the End of the Multi-State Consumer Class Action?, 36 
PEPP. L. REV. 879 (2009).  Additionally, in 2008, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
devoted an entire symposium—Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005—to this precise topic, which spawned several of the most important scholarly pieces written on 
CAFA to date.  See Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008); see, e.g., Burbank, A Preliminary View, supra note 14; 
Clermont & Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata, supra note 34; Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra 
note 40; Erichson, CAFA’s Impact, supra note 43; Purcell, CAFA in Perspective, supra note 29; 
Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process, supra note 49. 
 208.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 52 (2005) (discussing duplicative actions in particular and the 
“unfairness” that manifests itself when “[d]efendants are forced to defend the same case in many 
different courts[, a]nd class members are harmed because the various class counsel compete with 
each other to achieve the best settlement for the lawyers”). 
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but the only question in this Comment is whether permitting binding 
stipulations to defeat removal furthers either or both ends.  Not only are 
stipulations unfair to absent plaintiffs,209 they also do violence to the 
government interests at stake, interests that played just as vital a role in the 
passing of the legislation as did concerns of fairness.210 
When looking at a class action lawsuit in terms of its parties, it is easy to 
forget that the vast majority of them are not identified in the case caption.211  
While absentee class members represent a tiny fraction of members in the 
average class action lawsuit, their interest in the case is assumed to be just as 
important as that of the named parties.212  CAFA takes absentee plaintiffs 
into consideration, most vividly by providing that coupon settlements be 
subjected to enhanced scrutiny.213  Indeed, it seems possible that reports of 
CAFA’s anti-consumer bent have been greatly exaggerated.214  Such claims 
seem to rely on the fact that modern class actions are won and lost at the 
certification stage.215  Because the federal rules for class certification are 
stringent, any device that pushes class actions into federal court reduces the 
probability that plaintiffs will prevail.216  Of course, such arguments 
 
 209.  See infra Part V.C.2.a. 
 210.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 (“The purposes of the Act are therefore . . . to restore the 
intent of the Framers by expanding federal jurisdiction over interstate class actions . . . .”). 
 211.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 (2011) (reversing the 
certification of a class made up of approximately 1.5 million plaintiffs).  While this may be an 
extreme example, and “[c]ourts occasionally certify classes as small as a few score, . . . typically 
classes consist of at least hundreds of persons.”  YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 45, at 799. 
 212.  See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–48 (1999) (describing the due process and 
Seventh Amendment rights of absentee class members); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797, 809 (1985) (discussing “proper representation of the absent plaintiffs’ interest” and various 
protections of that interest). 
 213.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006).  The provisions related to coupon settlement are 
comprehensive.  In addition to a required hearing, which culminates in a finding that the settlement 
is “fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members,” see id. at § 1712(e), the statute provides 
limitations on contingency fees and other attorney’s fees, and the use of expert witnesses “to provide 
information on the actual value to the class members of the coupons that are redeemed.”  See id. at § 
1712(a)–(d). 
 214.  See Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra note 40, at 1798–99. 
 215.  TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 341–42 (“In many cases the certification 
decision is the decisive ruling in the case. . . . [I]f a litigation class action is certified, the enormous 
risks that a loss poses for the defendant makes settlement the likeliest outcome—a reality that often 
drives defendants’ opposition to class certification.”).  On the flip side, when a class is not certified, 
the action often ends in victory for the defendant because individual claims are not worth bringing.  
Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy 
Req[u]irement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 606 (2006). 
 216.  See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything 
About the Legal System?  Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 
(1998) (recording “that in diversity cases, the win rate drops from 71% in original cases to 34% in 
removed cases”). 
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implicitly assume that these lawsuits have merit and are worthy of class 
certification.217  But win rates are of little importance to a typical absentee 
class member who stands to gain worthless coupons as part of a 
settlement.218  That is to say, in such settlements, often it is not the plaintiffs 
that win; it is their lawyers.219  Federal rules, both those codified as part of 
Rule 23 and those enacted with the passage of CAFA, endeavor to make 
sure that settlements are fair to absentee plaintiffs.220  Myopic focus on the 
win rate makes sense if you value the class action only as a regulatory tool—
making the plaintiff whole is beside the point; you want to make the 
defendant pay.221  However, any solution that lines attorneys’ pockets and 
leaves the injured parties without just compensation cannot be described as 
fair.222  If it were true that binding stipulations were used only at the 
margins, to make borderline cases removal-proof, they might be more easily 
defended on fairness grounds.  But plaintiffs’ attorneys have shown no such 
restraint, employing stipulations even where the recovery will be cut in 
half,223 or by an order of magnitude.224 
 
 217.  Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra note 40, at 1798.  
 218.  See Leslie, supra note 55, at 995 (“Although coupon-based settlements may at first appear to 
be a reasonable mechanism to compensate class members, coupons are in fact often worthless 
despite their deceptively high face value.”). 
 219.  Id. (“In many cases, the class counsel appear to sell out the interests of the class in exchange 
for relatively generous attorneys’ fees.  While this represents a win-win scenario for the class 
counsel and the defendant, many class members are left uncompensated.”). 
 220.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (c)(2)(B), (e), (g); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 
(2005) (setting out the purposes of the act, including to combat state court methods of handling class 
actions that “contravene[] basic fairness and due process considerations”). 
 221.  There is much validity to this premise, which has been described as a “basic deterrence 
principle.”  John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1065 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) and STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW (1987)).  But it misses the point when the question is one of due process.  See infra 
Part V.C.2.a.  Additionally, if the defendant can negotiate a coupon settlement that turns a profit, the 
deterrent effect of the litigation is nil.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 222.  Congress’s envisioned role for federal courts in multi-state class actions may be overly 
ambitious though.  As long as courts refuse to certify a class on the theory that “variations in state 
law may swamp any common issues and defeat predominance,” Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 
1241, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 
1996)), it is hard to imagine them providing the stabilizing presence sought.  Nonetheless, it does not 
appear that any circuit has rejected this view of commonality.  See Rory Ryan, Uncertifiable?: The 
Current Status of Nationwide State-Law Class Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 470 (2002) (“Based 
primarily on the burden of applying multiple states’ laws, an overwhelming number of federal courts 
have denied certification of nationwide state-law class actions.”).  Of course, state courts tend to 
apply the same analysis.  Id. at 471.  The problem, then, is likely simply a reminder that “the class 
action is no panacea.”  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW 268 (1987). 
 223.  See, e.g., Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069, 1070–71 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(describing evidence showing that, if plaintiff’s allegations were true, damages would have accrued 
at a rate of $2 million a day for six days, totaling $12 million). 
 224.  See, e.g., Reagan v. ArcelorMittal, No. 2:11–CV–35, 2012 WL 1023107, at *2–3 (E.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 26, 2012) (documenting a phantom stipulation despite evidence showing damages of $56 
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Further, CAFA was more than a bit of procedural refereeing in the name 
of fairness.225  While forum shopping might create headaches for litigants, 
judicial hellholes create law.226  And that law can effectively regulate an 
entire area of national importance when the threat of being hauled into court 
and subjected to it looms.227  CAFA was designed in part to force national 
issues to the national stage and, conversely, to prevent single states from 
dictating national policy.228  While it seems fair to allow courts leeway when 
deciding procedural questions on prudential grounds, thereby letting them 
decide for themselves what is best, legitimate goals of Congress should not 
be trampled by sanctimonious judicial bodies, and defendants’ statutory 
right to remove should be protected.229  That is to say, blind reliance on 
principles for the simple reason that they have always been relied on ceases 
to be admirable when countervailing considerations demand that they be set 
aside.230 
In Lowdermilk, the court short-circuited its own analysis, first by 
observing at the outset that federal courts should strictly construe their own 
jurisdiction.231  While the pleasing idea of judicial restraint hangs heavy 
 
million). 
 225.  See Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra note 40, at 1788–89. 
 226.  Id. at 1804–05. 
 227.  See S. REP. No. 109–14, at 24 (2005) (bemoaning the current state of affairs, which allowed 
“one state court to dictate to 49 others what their laws should be on a particular issue, thereby 
undermining basic federalism principles”).   
 228.  Id. at 4 (identifying problems the legislation is designed to address including that “many 
state courts freely issue rulings in class action cases that have nationwide ramifications, sometimes 
overturning well-established laws and policies of other jurisdictions”). 
 229.  See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907) (“Federal courts 
should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that 
right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal court as to permit 
the state courts, in proper cases, to retain their own jurisdiction.”).  This is especially true where, as 
here, evidence suggests that judges have made a political battlefield out of CAFA.  See Clermont & 
Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata, supra note 34, at 1585–86 (documenting a plaintiff win-rate of 71% 
percent in front of Democrat-appointed judges versus 55% before Republican-appointed judges and 
noting that male Republican-appointed judges were “deciding CAFA cases in a way that expands 
federal jurisdiction” to a statistically significant extent).  Seeing as how CAFA was inarguably 
designed to expand federal jurisdiction, it is (Clermont and Eisenberg suggest, and with approval) 
“value laden” motivations on the part of other members of the judiciary that have constricted 
CAFA’s application.  See id. at 1586. 
 230.  See Back Doctors Ltd. v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 637 F.3d 827, 830 (2011) (“There is 
no presumption against federal jurisdiction in general, or removal in particular.  The Class Action 
Fairness Act must be implemented according to its terms, rather than in a manner that disfavors 
removal of large-stakes, multi-state class actions.”). 
 231.   See Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007).  It is worth 
noting that such “preferential rules and presumptions” have the effect of “load[ing] the dice for or 
against a particular result” and, accordingly, have been subjected to criticism.  See Scalia, supra note 
117, at 27–28 (1998).  In Justice Scalia’s words:  
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here, the cynic would do well to remember that the most breathtaking claim 
of judicial power in our nation’s history came cloaked in identical 
raiment.232  A closer inspection suggests that the Lowdermilk rationale 
should be viewed less as an exercise in restraint and more as an abdication 
of a duty placed upon it by Congress. 
In its latest term, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the notion that federal 
courts, “in the main ‘have no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, then [sic] to usurp that which is not given.’”233  
This general proposition seems to apply equally to cases involving “arising 
under” jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction, a conclusion supported by the 
fact that the Constitution treats the categories equally.234  Indeed, the 
deference played to the principle suggests that it is to be applied irrespective 
of underlying policy concerns.235  However, the Supreme Court has already 
“been willing to allow generous removal” in the name of efficiency and 
fairness.236  In Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,237 the Court held 
that removal was warranted simply because it would permit the application 
 
It is hard enough to provide a uniform, objective answer to the question whether a statute, 
on balance, more reasonably means one thing than another.  But it is virtually impossible 
to expect uniformity and objectivity when there is added, on one or the other side of the 
balance, a thumb of indeterminate weight.  How “narrow” is the narrow construction that 
certain types of statute are to be accorded; how clear does a broader intent have to be in 
order to escape it? . . . There are no answers to these questions, which is why these 
artificial rules increase the unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, of judicial decisions. 
Id. at 28. 
 232.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (claiming the power of judicial 
review—the authority to find an act of Congress unconstitutional—in order to find wanting 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus).  This is not to suggest that Chief Justice John Marshall got 
the case wrong or pulled a fast one on anybody.  It is simply a reminder that all is not as it seems.  
 233.  See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 132 S. Ct. 740, 747 (2012) (quoting Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). 
 234.  See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority . . . [and] to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different 
States . . . .”).  The counterargument would be that the very next clause, which makes the 
Constitution’s grant of federal jurisdiction subject to congressional “Exceptions” and “Regulations,” 
represents a sort of reverse Supremacy Clause—in this rare instance, because the Constitution 
provides for only the outer bounds of jurisdiction and Congress has the authority to constrict it, § 
1331 and § 1332 become “the supreme Law of the Land.”  Cf. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.  Because 
Mims and Cohens both involved “arising under” jurisdiction, § 1332 is not implicated and it would 
be wrong to rely on either of them for questions of diversity jurisdiction.  This is correct, but the 
general assertion, that federal courts have no option to decline jurisdiction when it is proper, is based 
on an entire reading of Article III and, indeed, the Constitution as a whole, which provides for 
separation of powers and describes the respective roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches.  See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (noting that to decline 
jurisdiction where proper or to exercise it where improper “would be treason to the [C]onstitution” 
(emphasis added)). 
 235.  Cf. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404 (“Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, 
but we cannot avoid them.”). 
 236.  Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 537 (1996). 
 237.  452 U.S. 394 (1981). 
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of res judicata to the case, which in an earlier incarnation had been already 
tried in federal court.238 
Additionally, the vitality of the maxim cited is, to a certain extent, 
questionable.239  The principle finds its roots in a pair of New Deal-era 
Supreme Court cases.240  Both expound the rule that federal jurisdiction is to 
be construed narrowly, and both explain why.  The reasons for the rule, it 
turns out, do not apply. 
In Healy v. Ratta, the question was whether diversity jurisdiction was 
proper: was the amount in controversy met?241  The argument that 
jurisdiction was proper relied on a novel calculation of the amount in 
controversy.242  The court rejected the argument, instead applying a simple 
analysis and reaching a simple conclusion.243  The amount in controversy 
had not been met.244  Then, the Court went on to explain the policy 
 
 238.  Originally, seven actions alleging an antitrust violation had been consolidated in federal 
district court.  Moitie, 452 U.S. at 395.  The suits did not survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
whereupon one of the plaintiff’s attorneys filed a substantively identical action in state court, 
alleging violation of state antitrust laws.  Id. at 396.  At that point, the defendants removed the case 
back to federal court and again motioned for dismissal, this time arguing that the case had been 
previously dismissed on the merits and could not be relitigated.  Id.  The district court denied the 
plaintiff’s motion for remand and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, decisions reversed by 
the Ninth Circuit.  Id. at 396–97.  In reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Court paid 
remarkably little attention to the removal statute itself, § 1441(b)—it is cited only as part of Justice 
Brennan’s dissent.  See, id. at 406 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Instead, the analysis turned on 
principles of equity and the meaning of “simple justice.”  See id. at 401 (majority opinion).  Thus, 
the Supreme Court made it clear that the principle that federal courts should strictly construe their 
jurisdiction must subordinate itself to articulable policy considerations. 
 239.  Of course, it is elementary that federal courts cannot proceed without subject matter 
jurisdiction and that the jurisdiction of federal courts is narrow, constrained both by the Constitution 
and by Congress.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  To the extent that these observations inform the 
maxim, it remains as good a rule as any.  However, other support for the principle relies on rockier 
footing.  See infra notes 241–61 and accompanying text. 
 240.  See City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C., 314 U.S. 63 (1941); Healy v. Ratta, 
292 U.S. 263 (1934). 
 241.  See Healy, 292 U.S. at 265.  Factually, the case was clear.  The plaintiff argued that a tax to 
be imposed upon him violated the Fourteenth Amendment and sought to enjoin its application.  Id. at 
264.  Of course, modernly this would be a claim “arising under the Constitution,” and federal subject 
matter jurisdiction would attach.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  However, even questions of federal law and 
the Constitution had to satisfy a minimum jurisdictional amount until 1980.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 304 (4th ed. 2003).  While the tax to be paid represented less than the 
jurisdictional amount, the plaintiff contended that the amount in controversy requirement was met 
because the indirect consequences of paying the tax or the penalties for refusing to pay it would 
exceed the statutory minimum.  See Healy, 292 U.S. at 267.  The Court held otherwise, reasoning 
simply that “[t]he tax, payment of which is demanded or resisted, is the matter in controversy, since 
payment of it would avoid the penalty and end the dispute.”  See id. at 268. 
 242.  See Healy, 292 U.S. at 266–67. 
 243.  See id. at 265, 269. 
 244.  Id. at 269. 
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supporting the rationale: 
Not only does the language of the statute point to this conclusion, 
but the policy clearly indicated by the successive acts of Congress 
regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts supports it. . . .  From 
the beginning suits between citizens of different states, or involving 
federal questions, could neither be brought in the federal courts nor 
removed to them, unless the value of the matter in controversy was 
more than a specified amount.  Cases involving lesser amounts have 
been left to be dealt with exclusively by state courts, except that 
judgment of the highest court of a state adjudicating a federal right 
may be reviewed by this Court.  Pursuant to this policy the 
jurisdiction of federal courts of first instance has been narrowed by 
successive acts of Congress, which have progressively increased the 
jurisdictional amount.  The policy of the statute calls for its strict 
construction.  The power reserved to the states, under the 
Constitution [Amendment 10], to provide for the determination of 
controversies in their courts may be restricted only by the action of 
Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of the Constitution 
[Article 3].  Due regard for the rightful independence of state 
governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they 
scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits 
which the statute has defined.245 
Less than ten years later, the Court granted certiorari in City of 
Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank of New York.246  There, the problem 
with jurisdiction was not that the amount in controversy had not been met; 
rather, the parties lacked the complete diversity typically required of 
diversity actions.247  Again the Court found it proper to explain the policy 
behind the rule.248  In addition to quoting extensively from Healy, Justice 
Frankfurter made other key observations: 
The dominant note in the successive enactments of Congress 
relating to diversity jurisdiction, is one of jealous restriction, of 
avoiding offense to state sensitiveness, and of relieving the federal 
courts of the overwhelming burden of “business that intrinsically 
belongs to the state courts,” in order to keep them free for their 
distinctive federal business. . . . In defining the boundaries of 
diversity jurisdiction, this Court must be mindful of this guiding 
 
 245.  Id. at 269–70 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 246.  See City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C., 314 U.S. 63 (1941). 
 247.  Id. at 74–75. 
 248.  See id. at 76–77. 
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Congressional policy.249 
What can be drawn from the decisions are four key observations.  First, 
the “strict construction” called for is a result of policy considerations—the 
policy animating congressional action, not abstract policy concerns.250  
Second, much weight was given to the fact that Congress had acted to 
consistently narrow diversity jurisdiction.251  CAFA, of course, represents 
the opposite, an expansion of diversity jurisdiction.252  Third, CAFA 
accounts for the need to “avoid[] offense to state sensitivities” by offering a 
specific means of letting states handle cases in which their interests in the 
litigation are heightened.253  In fact, the Senate Report indicates 
 
 249.  Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. 
REV. 483, 510 (1928)) (emphasis added). 
 250.  See id.; Healy, 292 U.S. at 269–70. 
 251.  See City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 76; Healy, 292 U.S. at 270 (“Pursuant to this policy the 
jurisdiction of federal courts of first instance has been narrowed by successive acts of Congress, 
which have progressively increased the jurisdictional amount.  The policy of the statute calls for its 
strict construction.” (citation omitted)). 
 252.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006) (expanding federal jurisdiction to cases where only 
minimal diversity exists so long as certain requirements are met).  Indeed, the only present trend of 
any sort is to expand federal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2006) (establishing federal 
jurisdiction over cases with only minimal diversity where “at least 75 natural persons have died in 
the accident at a discrete location” so long as certain conditions are met); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 
(expanding federal jurisdiction to include state law claims that bear a certain relationship to claims 
properly brought in federal court); cf. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, sec. 103, 125 Stat. 758, 760–61 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441,1446 to 
make removal easier in general but not, technically, expanding jurisdiction).  But see id. at § 101, 
125 Stat. at 758 (constricting federal jurisdiction in cases where resident aliens could, previously, 
conceivably have served as the basis for diversity jurisdiction); id. at § 102, 125 Stat. at 758–59 
(resolving a circuit split in the favor of narrowing federal jurisdiction as to corporations).   
  While section 101 “achieve[s] the goal of modestly restricting jurisdiction,”  H.R. REP. NO. 
112-10, at 7 (2011), and section 102 accomplishes the same thing “in a small range of cases for 
which a Federal forum might be available today,” id. at 9,  the effects of the Act cut in the opposite 
direction with regard to removal jurisdiction.  See Laura M. Fontaine, The Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011: New Legislation Expands Removal Jurisdiction in 
Federal Court, VINSON & ELKINS (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.velaw.com/resources/FederalCourtsJu 
risdictionVenueClarificationAct2011.aspx (stating that the Act “will significantly increase the 
number of cases that a defendant may remove from state court to federal court by eliminating 
procedural roadblocks to federal jurisdiction”).   
 253.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)–(4).  The provisions read as follows: 
 (3) A district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2) over a class action in 
which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all proposed 
plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in 
which the action was originally filed based on consideration of— 
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest; 
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which the 
action was originally filed or by the laws of other States; 
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unambiguously that close questions should be resolved in favor of CAFA 
removal.254  Finally, whereas the Supreme Court viewed the successive 
contractions of diversity jurisdiction as a means of alleviating the 
“overwhelming burden” of cases better left to the states,255 Congress 
 
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid 
Federal jurisdiction; 
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class 
members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; 
(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally 
filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the 
number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of 
the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States; and 
(F) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or 
more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same 
or other persons have been filed. 
(4) A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2)— 
(A)(i) over a class action in which— 
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in 
the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed; 
(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant— 
(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff 
class; 
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims 
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed; 
and 
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related 
conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was 
originally filed; and 
(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class 
action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of 
the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons; or 
(B) two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the 
aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action 
was originally filed. 
Id. 
  Subsection (3) has often been referred to as the “local controversy exception,” while 
subsection (4) has been dubbed the “home state exception.” 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3724, at 908 (4th ed. 2009).  Together, the provisions 
function to keep cases that belong in state court in state court.  See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 23 (2005) 
(“The bill . . . includes several provisions ensuring that where appropriate, state courts can adjudicate 
certain class actions that have a truly local focus.”).  But see Michael D. Y. Sukenik & Adam J. 
Levitt, CAFA and Federalized Ambiguity: The Case for Discretion in the Unpredictable Class 
Action, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 233, 240, 242 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/ 
945.pdf (arguing that the “practical effect [of the provisions] is far removed from their stated intent” 
and that district court judges should have expanded discretion in determining “whether a particular 
multistate class action should be adjudicated in state or federal court”). 
 254.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (“Overall, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand 
substantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions.  Its provisions should be read broadly, with 
a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed 
by any defendant.”).  In fact, the Senate Report goes so far as to specifically state that a provision 
granting an exemption from CAFA’s removal mechanism should “be narrowly construed.”  See id. at 
45.   
 255. See City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C., 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941). 
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determined that no concerns about the federal court’s “overwhelming 
workload” were implicated with the passage of the Act256 and, just as 
importantly, that these actions were not “business intrinsically belong[ing] to 
the state courts.”257  Instead, the precise opposite was true.258 
The second threshold observation by the Lowdermilk court was that the 
plaintiff is the master of his complaint and entitled, more or less, to choose 
his forum.259  Axiomatic as this may seem, it is surely a funny place to start 
the analysis considering that the primary purpose of CAFA is to give 
defendants the opportunity to remove to federal court.260  Indeed, in other 
 
 256. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 51–53 (citing a number of statistics and facts to show that state 
courts were just as burdened as federal courts); see also John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller,  
They’re Making a Federal Case Out of It . . . In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 151 
(2001) (“The civil caseload in state courts has grown much more rapidly than the federal court civil 
caseload[, and f]ederal courts have more resources to meet this challenge.”). 
 257.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (indicating that 
the legislation is targeted at getting “cases of national importance” into federal court). 
 258.  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(3)–(4) (excluding cases from removal where a showing 
could be made that the case belonged in state court). 
 259.  See Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2007).  The string 
cite that follows this uncontroversial proposition includes a pair of Supreme Court cases.  See id.  
Neither are class action cases.  Instead, they represent the classic bipolar model of litigation, with a 
single plaintiff and a single defendant.  See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976) (describing bipolar lawsuits, in which “[l]itigation is 
organized as a contest between two individuals or at least two unitary interests, diametrically 
opposed, to be decided on a winner-takes-all basis,” as part of the traditional model).  In both cases, 
the Court simply confirmed plaintiffs’ prerogative to bring only state law claims, despite the 
presence of a federal claim, and thereby avoid federal jurisdiction.  The older case, Caterpillar Inc. 
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), a staple of first-year federal civil procedure classes, established 
that: 
The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded 
complaint rule,” which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.  The rule 
makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by 
exclusive reliance on state law.  
Id. at 392 (1987) (citation omitted). 
  The latter case relied on the same rationale in holding that a counterclaim based on federal 
law would not make a case removable to federal court.  See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831–32 (2002) (“Allowing a counterclaim to establish ‘arising 
under’ jurisdiction would also contravene the longstanding policies underlying our precedents.  First, 
since the plaintiff is ‘the master of the complaint,’ the well-pleaded-complaint rule enables him, ‘by 
eschewing claims based on federal law, . . . to have the cause heard in state court.’” (quoting 
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 398–99)).  Note the high cost of avoiding removal; entire causes of 
action must be abandoned.  In CAFA cases, the cost of avoiding removal is possibly comparable—
the damages sought must be limited to less than $5 million—but this pecuniary sacrifice cuts to the 
very heart of the Rule 23 adequacy of representation argument.  See infra Part V.C.2.a–b. 
 260.  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (“The purposes 
of this Act are to . . . restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing 
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction 
. . . .”). 
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contexts, other courts have recognized the shortcomings of the cliché as 
applied to CAFA cases.261 
3.  Analogizing Stipulated Damages with Claim-Splitting 
Sometimes, to increase the probability of class certification or to avoid 
removal to federal court or for other reasons, plaintiffs in a class action will 
choose to forego certain available claims, despite the fact that claim 
preclusion will attach and prevent those claims from ever being heard in 
court.262  This practice, known as “claim splitting,”263 is often attacked by 
defendants on the grounds of adequacy264—”[t]he challengers view failure to 
raise all possible claims as splitting the cause of action, thereby leaving the 
class members at risk that a later court will find the omitted claims to be 
precluded.”265  Citing a “serious conflict of interest,” the Fifth Circuit has 
taken the position that the tactic is impermissible.266  More recently, with 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court expressed its own 
concerns.267 
 
 261.  See, e.g., Grimsdale v. Kash N’ Karry Food Stores, Inc. (In re Hannaford Bros. Co. 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 564 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[W]e do not mean to say that 
the four corners of the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily control the question of whether CAFA’s 
home state exception applies.  We do not rely on the maxim that the plaintiff is the master of his own 
complaint—the answer to that question is that it depends.”). 
 262.  Edward F. Sherman, “Abandoned Claims” in Class Actions: Implications for Preclusion 
and Adequacy of Counsel, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 483, 483–84 (2011) [hereinafter Sherman, 
Abandoned Claims].  Though it varies somewhat between jurisdictions, “a final judgment on the 
merits of an action [generally] precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were 
or could have been raised in that action.”  Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (emphasis 
added). 
 263.  Trask, supra note 91, at 325. 
 264.  See, e.g., Coleman v. GM Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64, 80 (M.D. Tenn. 2004); Clark v. 
Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 8:00-1217-24, No. 8:00-1218-24, No. 8:00-1219-24, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20024, at *11–12 (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2001); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 
185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
 265.  Sherman, Abandoned Claims, supra note 262, at 484. 
 266.  See McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 283 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 267.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).  While the class was 
certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), which covers cases where “final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), the plaintiffs also 
sought backpay, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.  Under their theory, which the Ninth Circuit adopted, an 
award of backpay would be appropriate even as part of a (b)(2) class because the claims for backpay 
“did not ‘predominat[e]’ over the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief.”  Id. at 2550 
(alteration in original) (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616 (9th Cir. 2010)).  
The chief difference between a class certified under (b)(2) and a class certified under (b)(3) is that 
the latter requires “individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort” 
and includes an option for would-be class members to opt out of the litigation and preserve the right 
to bring their own claims separately.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).    
  A unanimous Court held “that, at a minimum, claims for individualized relief (like the 
backpay at issue here) do not satisfy the Rule.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.  The primary bases of the 
holding were that “the relief sought [in (b)(2) class actions] must perforce affect the entire class at 
once” and that in no case predating the codification of Rule 23 did analogous actions include “any 
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Claim-splitting conflicts both with Rule 23(a)(4) and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution in a manner analogous to the problems 
created by stipulations—both create conflicts of interest between absent 
class members and their attorneys, which by extension undermine their right 
to due process.268  Both techniques increase the probability of class 
certification,269 meaning plaintiffs have a better chance of winning if they 
are allowed.270  But both also potentially strip absentee class members of 
recovery, and neither gives them a say in the matter.271  To illustrate the 
similarities in analysis, consider the approach the Texas Supreme Court took 
 
claim for individualized relief.”  Id. at 2558.  Such actions, the Court determined, were better left for 
(b)(3) because it included additional protections that were unnecessary for (b)(2) actions, where any 
relief would necessarily affect all members of the class and make opt-out provisions moot.  Id.  The 
Court went on to reject the “predominance” test proposed by the plaintiffs:  
 [The] predominance test, moreover, creates perverse incentives for class representatives 
to place at risk potentially valid claims for monetary relief.  In this case, for example, the 
named plaintiffs declined to include employees’ claims for compensatory damages in 
their complaint.  That strategy of including only backpay claims made it more likely that 
monetary relief would not “predominate.”  But it also created the possibility (if the 
predominance test were correct) that individual class members’ compensatory-damages 
claims would be precluded by litigation they had no power to hold themselves apart 
from.  If it were determined, for example, that a particular class member is not entitled to 
backpay because her denial of increased pay or a promotion was not the product of 
discrimination, that employee might be collaterally estopped from independently seeking 
compensatory damages based on that same denial.  That possibility underscores the need 
for plaintiffs with individual monetary claims to decide for themselves whether to tie their 
fates to the class representatives’ or go it alone—a choice Rule 23(b)(2) does not ensure 
that they have. 
Id. at 2559.  Thus the Court identified the plaintiff’s claim-splitting, acknowledged that it increased 
the likelihood of certification, and found the whole thing “perverse” because it created a conflict of 
interest between the class representatives and the absentee class members.  See id.  And, of course, 
conflict of interests cut to the heart of Rule 23(a)’s adequacy requirement.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).   
 268.  See infra Part V.C.2.a. 
 269.  Claim-splitting increases the chances of class certification by making common questions 
predominate.  Sherman, Abandoned Claims, supra note 262, at 483 (“For example, class members 
may have a claim under both the state consumer protection act and common law fraud, but the fraud 
claim is not asserted because individual reliance would be required and the class action would fail to 
satisfy the predominance requirement.”).  Stipulations make class certification more likely simply 
because they function to keep cases in state court, where class certification is more likely than it 
would be in federal court.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1262–63 (2002); see also 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed. 2005) (“The determination whether or not to certify an 
action as a class action has enormous implications for all the participants—the named parties, the 
absent class members, and the court itself.”). 
 271. See Sherman, Abandoned Claims, supra note 262, at 488 (acknowledging that valuable and 
lucrative claims of absentee class members can be lost as a result of claim-splitting); see also infra 
Part V.C.2.a (discussing the negative impact of stipulations on absentee class members). 
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in finding claim-splitting to potentially conflict with its state rules of civil 
procedure and due process protections of the United States Constitution: 
Due process requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately 
represent the interests of the absent class members, as well as notice 
plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation. . . . 
[A] certifying court . . . must protect the due process rights of absent 
class members by ensuring that the class representative adequately 
represents their interests. . . . 
. . . . 
A class representative’s decision to abandon certain claims may be 
detrimental to absent class members for whom those claims could 
be more lucrative or valuable, assuming those class members do not 
opt out of the class.  Abandoning such claims, or claims “reasonably 
expected” to be raised by class members, could undermine the 
adequacy of the named plaintiff’s representation of the class.  We 
hold, therefore, that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 requires the 
trial court, as part of its rigorous analysis, to consider the risk that a 
judgment in the class action may preclude subsequent litigation of 
claims not alleged, abandoned, or split from the class action.  The 
trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider the preclusive 
effect of a judgment on abandoned claims, as res judicata could 
undermine the adequacy of representation requirement.272 
 
 272.  Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 456–57 (Tex. 2007) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Daccach, a “worldwide class” had been certified in 
the wake of alleged securities fraud.  Id at 435.  Despite the presence of several claims, the plaintiffs 
brought only one—that the defendant failed to register with the Texas Securities Board before 
offering or selling securities in the state.  See id. at 440.  At the intermediate appellate level, Citizens 
had argued, inter alia, “that because Daccach abandoned all claims but the Texas Securities Act 
claim, he was not an adequate representative of the class . . . and Daccach improperly seeks to 
resolve a single issue instead of the entire controversy.”  Id. at 448.  The argument had been rejected 
by way of holding: “[c]lients who have claims not raised in this class action because the claims are 
unsuitable for class treatment can bring those claims on an individual basis, and res judicata will not 
bar those claims because absent class members had no opportunity to litigate those issues in this 
lawsuit.”  Id. (quoting Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hakim Daccach, 105 S.W.3d 712, 725 (Tex. App. 
2003)).  Daccach did not even try to argue that the res judicata effect had no bearing on the question 
of adequacy.  See id.  Rather, he argued that preclusion would not attach; Rule 42 of Texas Rules of 
Civil Procedure meant that the action only could have been certified in the absence of the other 
claims, meaning that could not have been brought for the purposes of a classic preclusion analysis.  
Id. 
  In rejecting Daccach’s argument, the court undertook a traditional preclusion analysis and 
noted that “there is no right to litigate a claim as a class action.”  Id. at 450 (quoting Ford Motor Co. 
v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444, 452–53 (Tex. 2000)).  Importantly, the same is true in federal courts, and 
just as importantly, Texas law generally “rel[ies] on . . . persuasive federal decisions and authorities 
interpreting current federal class action requirements,” making Daccach an apposite case study.  See 
Daccach, 217 S.W.2d at 449.  Because there was no right to bring a class action, the claim could 
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It seems that much the same analysis would apply where a named 
plaintiff stipulates that damages will be less than $5 million despite evidence 
showing the actual amount in controversy to be far higher.  In such a case, 
the Texas Supreme Court’s analysis need only be slightly reworded: 
Due process requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately 
represent the interests of the absent class members, as well as notice 
plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation. . . .  
[A] certifying court . . . must protect the due process rights of absent 
class members by ensuring that the class representative adequately 
represents their interests. . . . 
. . . . 
A class representative’s decision to [forego a substantial portion of 
the possible recovery] may be detrimental to absent class members 
[because the alternative is, by definition,] more lucrative or 
valuable, assuming those class members do not opt out of the class.  
[Disclaiming any right to relief] “reasonably expected” to be 
[sought] by class members could undermine the adequacy of the 
named plaintiff’s representation of the class. . . . We hold, therefore, 
that . . . . [t]he trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider 
[that the decision of plaintiffs attorneys to forego a substantial 
portion of potential relief] could undermine the adequacy of 
representation requirement.273 
While the Supreme Court in Dukes did not so tidily describe its analysis, 
the concern was that absentee class members with no opportunity to opt out 
of the litigation would potentially be precluded from bringing backpay 
claims in the event that the class was certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and the 
plaintiffs lost at trial.274  These precise concerns also animate the discussion 
in other claim-splitting cases, with the notable, and perhaps dispositive, 
caveat that the Dukes discussion was limited to (b)(2) cases.275  Further, it is 
 
have been brought in another form and, therefore, any claims not presently brought would likely be 
precluded thereafter.  Id. at 451–55. 
 273.  Cf. id. at 456–57 (alteration to original). 
 274.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (reasoning that the danger 
of a res judicata effect being applied to absent class members who had no opportunity to opt out of 
the first action weighed against a finding that a case could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2)). 
 275.  See id. (noting that (b)(2) classes lack “Rule 23(b)(3)’s procedural protections”).  Indeed, 
under Daccach, so long as adequate notice was provided to the absentee class members such that 
they understood that a failure to opt out meant that some claims could become barred, classes 
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notable that the Court expressed its discomfort with claim-splitting in a case 
where substantial recovery on behalf of the class members—injunctive relief 
and backpay—was sought.276  This can be contrasted with stipulations cases 
where the attorneys pledge to seek only a fraction of the actual amount in 
controversy and where individual plaintiffs may only receive worthless 
coupons in the event of a settlement.277 
B.  CAFA and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Perhaps the most befuddling of the Constitution’s enumerated powers,278 
the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority “To regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”279  As a corollary, the power of states to regulate such commerce is 
limited and can neither discriminate against interstate commerce280 nor place 
unreasonable burdens upon it.281  This principle is known as the Dormant 
Commerce Clause,282 and while the appellation may be relatively modern, 
the seminal case of Gibbons v. Ogden283 relied on the theory.284  This 
limitation applies only to legislative enactments however.  Judge-made 
common law is outside the reach of the commerce clause.285  As a result, 
especially in torts cases, the law of one jurisdiction can de facto dictate 
 
featuring abandoned claims could be certified.  See Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 458.  This enhanced 
notice approach suggests a possible solution for the problem of binding stipulations—one ultimately 
rejected for practical reasons.  See infra Part V.C.2.d. 
 276.  See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541. 
 277.  See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 278.  See Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s 
Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 851 (2002) (“[C]ourts, executives, 
and legislatures, at the federal and state level alike, are often at a loss about how to approach the 
problem.”). 
 279.  U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 280.  See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
 281.  See, e.g., So. Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (“[T]he states have not been 
deemed to have authority to impede substantially the free flow of commerce from state to state, or to 
regulate those phases of the national commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, 
demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority.”). 
 282.  E.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA & M. ISABEL MEDINA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY, 
& PRACTICE 250 (4th ed. 2011). 
 283.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 284.  See id. at 197–212 (reasoning that Congress’s power, while expressly limited by the 
Constitution, is “plenary as to those [enumerated powers, including the commerce power, and 
therefore] is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government,” meaning that 
states have no power to enact legislation interfering with this Congress’s plenary grant of power). 
 285.  See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ’g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901) (“[T]he principles of the 
common law are operative upon all interstate commercial transactions except so far as they are 
modified by congressional enactment.”); see also Frederick H. Cooke, The Supreme Court, the 
Commerce Clause and Common Law Rules, 19 YALE L.J. 32, 32–35 (1909) (explaining the 
difference between statutory law and the common law and how Dormant Commerce Clause 
questions can hinge upon the distinction). 
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national policy.286  It was with an eye toward this loophole that Congress 
passed CAFA.287  Thus, CAFA is about more than providing for fairness 
between litigating parties.  It is also designed to prevent the courts of single 
states from unduly burdening interstate commerce.288 
In Commerce Clause cases, there seems to be little doubt of the 
impropriety of allowing a single state to wield power burdening its sister 
states.289  As a result, the commerce power has been construed more broadly 
over time.290  Whether or not this is as it should be, it makes little sense that 
 
 286.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 60 (2005) (“When state courts preside over class actions 
involving claims of residents of more than one state, they frequently dictate the substantive laws of 
other states, sometimes over the protests of those other jurisdictions . . . . When that happens, there is 
little those other jurisdictions can do, since the judgment of a court in one state is not reviewable by 
the state court of another jurisdiction.”).  The authors of the Report concluded that it was “far more 
appropriate” that a federal judge be tasked with such questions than a given state judge, asking: 
“Why should a state court judge be able to overrule other state laws and policies? Why should state 
courts be setting national policy?”  See id. at 60–61; see also supra notes 38–39 and accompanying 
text. 
 287.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 (describing one of the primary aims of CAFA as the 
restoration of “the intent of the Framers by expanding federal jurisdiction over interstate class 
actions”); see also supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  To this end, the Report describes the 
question of “[w]hether the claims asserted are of ‘significant national or interstate interest’” as one to 
be determined by a balancing test: 
[T]he federal court should inquire whether the case does present issues of national or 
interstate significance of this sort.  If such issues are identified, that point favors the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction.  If such issues are not identified and the matter appears to 
be more of a local (or intrastate) controversy, that point would tip in favor of allowing a 
state court to handle the matter. 
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 36–37.  In the Act itself, these concerns are reflected in the Findings and 
Purposes section.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, § 2(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006) (“Over 
the past decade, there have been abuses of the class action device that have . . . adversely affected 
interstate commerce . . . .”). 
 288.  See Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra note 40, at 1804–05. 
 289.  See, e.g., So. Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (“[T]he states have not been 
deemed to have authority to impede substantially the free flow of commerce from state to state, or to 
regulate those phases of the national commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, 
demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority.”); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 42 (James Madison) (arguing that without the grant of authority provided in the Commerce 
Clause states would have both power and incentive to shape the law in a manner discriminating 
against their counterparts). 
 290.  See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying 
First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social 
Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999) (identifying 1936 as the year in which the scope of the Commerce 
Clause began to grow and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), as the case that “transformed the 
Commerce Clause by declaring that it not only included ‘commerce’ . . . but also ‘economics’”).  
This trend slowed considerably with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that 
the Commerce Clause could not be read so expansively as to give Congress the authority to enact 
certain provisions of the Violence Against Women Act) and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) (holding the same with regard to the Gun-Free School Act).  While any thinking that these 
cases represent an approaching constriction of the commerce power’s scope has proven somewhat 
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policy concerns underlying a classic Commerce Clause question should be 
given so much weight in that context but receive little or no consideration at 
all when the battlefield shifts from the statehouse to the court room.  This is 
doubly so when one considers the fact that in Commerce Clause cases the 
political process propels the change in the law whereas state judges—some 
elected, some appointed291—change the law by decree and order.292  While 
some commentators view CAFA as an encroachment on important principles 
of federalism,293 the principle underlying federalism is that states should be 
able to govern themselves and handle local issues without excessive 
interference from the federal government, which should limit its action to 
matters concerning the nation as a whole.294  The only federalism at stake in 
the case of nationwide class actions is a perversion of its original form.295  
Allowing “locally-elected state court judges to adjudicate the claims of 
absent nonresident class members against nonresident businesses involving 
causes of action that are not uniquely related to that jurisdiction” undermines 
the Commerce Clause and furthers no legitimate interest of federalism.296 
 
off the mark, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), change is clearly afoot.  See Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) . 
 291.  See Sandra Day O’Connor, The Debate Over Judicial Elections and State Court Judicial 
Selection, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1347, 1420 (2008) (describing the present situation in which 
some states elect judges and others appoint them, and urging states to consider turning to the 
appointment model).  This aspect of the problem should not be understated.  In cases where elected 
judges preside, the combination of an out-of-state corporate defendant and plaintiffs among the 
electorate undoubtedly create at least the appearance of unfairness.  See Nagareda, The 
Administrative State, supra note 50, at 612–13. 
 292.  See Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Policy, supra note 40, at 1804–05. 
 293.  See, e.g., Marcus, Federalism Implications, supra note 206, at 1251 (“Particularly when 
federal judges systematically favor defendants in categories of disputes for which state law provides 
the rule of decision, the federal exercise of jurisdiction may mean that state law will receive less 
enforcement than if cases stay in state court.  Diversity jurisdiction then affects the power of states to 
regulate the types of conduct that become the subject of these disputes.  The assertion of federal 
jurisdiction thereby alters the federalism balance, and does so without a positive law enacted through 
the democratic process.”); Heather Scribner, Protecting Federalism Interests After the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005: A Response to Professor Vairo, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2005) (“If 
federal courts were to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent of CAFA’s grant, the states’ sovereign 
interests in developing their own laws and regulating on behalf of their own citizens would suffer.”); 
Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism: The Implications of the New Federalism 
Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1560 
(2000) (analyzing an early version of CAFA and positing that “Congress has taken a surprisingly 
antifederalist approach to federal court jurisdiction”); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 87 (2005) 
(Minority Views) (proposing amendments to CAFA in consideration of “Federalism concerns”). 
 294.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 105–06 (2005). 
 295.  See Underwood, supra note 48, at 405–06. 
 296.  Id. at 405; see also Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999 and Workplace Goods 
Job Growth and Competitiveness Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1875 and H.R. 2005 Before the H. 
Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 119 (1999) (statement of Walter E. Dellinger, III) (“Many 
state courts faced with interstate class actions . . . have undertaken to dictate the substantive laws of 
other states by applying their own laws to all other states, which results essentially in a breach of 
federalism principles by fellow states (not by the federal government).  And because the state court 
decision has binding effect everywhere by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the other states 
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C.  A Simple Answer to a Complex Problem: How Lessons from the Field of 
Complex Litigation Inform the Problem 
Defining the term complex litigation has proven immensely difficult.297  
Luckily, CAFA cases tend to be paradigmatic complex litigation cases, and 
only a brief discussion of what makes them so is necessary.298  While 
Professor Tidmarsh’s conception of complex litigation—”Litigation in an 
adversarial system in which the judicial power necessary to overcome the 
dysfunction of the lawyers, the jury, or the parties results in procedural 
disparities that cause substantively disparate outcomes among similarly 
situated parties, claims, or transactions”299—seems to be as good as any and 
better than most, a striking analogy made by Professor Lon L. Fuller in his 
early work on the subject is an instructive place to start.300 
 
will have no way of revisiting the interpretation of their own laws.”).  Professor Underwood 
provides an example:  
[I]f a state court judge rules that a defendant’s business practice is unlawful, that 
defendant will almost certainly have to change its behavior in response to the 
determination or face the risk of not only additional, similar lawsuits (perhaps by the 
same class counsel), but also punitive or treble damages available under many states’ 
deceptive trade practice statutes or similar legislation, as well as ramifications on the 
continued economic viability of the defendants and their ability to stay in business in 
those remote locations. 
Underwood, supra note 48, at 406.   
  This hypothetical is not far removed from an actual case, often cited to illustrate the reverse-
federalism problem.  See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005); see also S. REP. No. 109-14, at 24–25 
(citing Avery as among those “most egregious of such cases . . . in which one state court issues 
nationwide rulings that actually contradict the laws of other states”).  By providing customers with 
non-original equipment manufacturer (non-OEM) parts as replacements, State Farm violated Illinois 
law, notwithstanding the fact that the policy made clear that such parts would be provided.  See 
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 810–13 (Ill. 2005).  Judgment was entered 
against State Farm in excess of $1 billion.  Id. at 810.  While the Illinois Supreme Court eventually 
reversed, it took four years after the intermediate appeal, six years after the trial, and eight years after 
the originally complaint was filed, to get it right.  See id. at 812.  But see Marcus, Federalism 
Implications, supra note 206, at 1294 (arguing that, because the Illinois Supreme Court got it right 
eventually, “Avery is not a great example of a single county court exercising unchecked power over 
nationwide conduct”). 
 297.  See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 35–47. 
 298.  For its understanding of complex litigation, this Comment relies heavily on the work of 
Professors Jay Tidmarsh and Roger H. Trangsrud.  See generally JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. 
TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 2010). 
 299.  Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of 
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1801 (1992).  This conception of complex litigation 
can be contrasted with one of simple litigation, where courts are “passive arbiters of bipolar private 
controversies,” and following a trial, “the judge applies preexisting legal norms to determine liability 
and define appropriate relief.”  Rhode, supra note 196, at 1187.  As discussed later, St. Paul Mercury 
represents a classic example.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 300.  Indeed, Professor Tidmarsh and Professor Trangsrud’s book begins a section entitled “The 
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We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web. 
A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated 
pattern throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull 
will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting 
tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of 
tensions. This would certainly occur, for example, if the doubled 
pull caused one or more of the weaker strands to snap. This is a 
“polycentric” situation because it is “many centered”—each 
crossing of strands is a distinct center for distributing tensions.301 
Even proceeding with Tidmarsh’s definition, the idea of polycentrism 
vividly conceptualizes the problem.302  By definition, a lawsuit removable 
under CAFA is a non-local class action with at least $5 million at 
controversy and at least 100 class members.303  This is a model example of 
complex litigation.304 
1.  Complex Litigation: Its Inherent Difficulties and the Devices 
Designed to Address Them 
Typical problems seen in complex litigation include the danger of a 
multiplicity of lawsuits and the threat of inconsistent recovery.305  Of course, 
both of these problems arise where multiple actions are filed based on either 
one alleged wrong or a series of related wrongs.306  When CAFA is analyzed 
 
Meaning of Complex Litigation” with excerpts from the Fuller article and includes this passage.  See 
TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 2. 
 301.  Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395 (1978). 
 302.  The use of binding stipulations can be seen as pulling on the strand of Professor’s Fuller’s 
spider web.  While such manipulation is harmless in simple litigation, see infra Part IV.C.2., things 
are far less simple in the web of complex litigation where the same pull can create due process 
problems, agency cost problems, and federalism problems.  See supra notes 175–80 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 403–10 and accompanying text. 
 303.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). 
 304.  Cf. TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 2 (“The Microsoft antitrust litigation, 
Brown v. Board of Education, and the thousands of asbestos cases clogging court dockets are 
paradigms of complex civil litigation.”). 
 305.  See Julia Christine Bunting, Ashley v. Abbott Laboratories: Reconfiguring the Personal 
Jurisdiction Analysis in Mass Tort Litigation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 189, 232 (1994) (noting that in 
complex litigation “the dangers of multiple actions and inconsistent judgments are especially 
potent”).  
 306.  Look no further than the Skechers Shape-ups litigation for an example.  See supra note 140 
and accompanying text.  The allegation leveled against Skechers by Patty Tomlinson, that Shape-ups 
don’t actually function as the “toning shoes” advertising made them out to be, has been made by 
other plaintiffs in other courts—from federal court in California to separate actions filed in the state 
of Arkansas.  See Tomlinson v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142862, at *2 (W.D. 
Ark. May 25, 2011).  Whether Skechers should be held liable seems to be a question with one 
answer—either the shoes function as advertised or they do not.  Nonetheless, they must potentially 
litigate that one question on several fronts, see In re: Skechers Toning Shoe Prods. Liab. Litig., 831 
F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1368 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ motion includes twelve actions pending in nine 
districts, as listed on Schedule A.  The Panel also has been notified of eight additional related 
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as a mere procedural mechanism—”[CAFA] is court reform[,] not tort 
reform,” in the words of the Senate Report prepared in advance of the 
legislation307—its value becomes apparent.  Granted, the law is not value-
neutral,308 but procedurally it fits right in to a modern legal landscape in 
which complex litigation is more common and tools that provide 
aggregation and encourage consistent outcomes are increasingly 
necessary.309 
Not only do federal courts have the resources and tools to address 
problems presented by complex litigation,310 they use them effectively.311  
Great emphasis is put on class actions in particular,312 and “the presence of 
dueling class actions makes the case a near shoo-in for MDL treatment.”313  
For example, in the Skechers U.S.A. Inc. litigation described supra,314 
Skechers has been named a defendant in several class actions alleging either 
personal injury or misleading advertising, and, accordingly, the actions have 
been consolidated for pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.315  
 
actions.”), and in the event of a trial, the answer may not always be the same, see Edward F. 
Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 511 (1987). 
 307.  S. REP. No. 109-14, at 56 (2005). 
 308.  See Burbank, A Preliminary View, supra note 14, at 1442. 
 309.  JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and 
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 745–50 (2004) (examining then-pending CAFA’s fit in 
the modern complex litigation landscape). 
 310.  See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3861 (3d ed. 
2005) (describing the evolution of federal courts’ approach to complex litigation and some of the 
more important procedural developments). 
 311.  See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991) 
(utilizing a 28 U.S.C. § 1407 MDL transfer to consolidate 26,639 asbestos actions for pretrial 
proceedings); Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (In re Bendectin Litig.), 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 
1988) (affirming a trial court’s decision to trifurcate proceedings with regard to proximate cause 
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 312.  See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 159. 
 313.  Id.  The text cites a number of cases in support, including In re Toys “R” Us–Delaware, 
Inc., Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2008).  The 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s decision in that case represents the fewest number of 
actions ever consolidated under § 1407.  TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 159.  There 
were only two.  In re Toys “R” Us, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.  While that factor and others 
represented “sound arguments” in opposition to consolidation, it seems likely that a desire to 
“prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, especially with respect to class certification” was dispositive.  
See id.; see also TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 156 (explaining that other factors cited 
in the case are typically cited as mere “boilerplate”). 
 314.  See supra note 140. 
 315.  See In re: Skechers Toning Shoe Prods. Liab. Litig., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2011).  
Under the Multidistrict Litigation statute, actions can be consolidated in one district for pretrial 
proceedings so long as the “actions involv[e] one or more common questions of fact,” the transfer is 
“for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such 
actions.”  28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).  Like other tools, its application is limited to cases already in 
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This tool does not exist in state courts,316 and its utilization was opposed by 
Skechers U.S.A., illustrating that there is no inherent advantage to 
defendants when class actions are funneled into federal court.317 
2.  Putting St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. in Its Place 
If complex litigation represents a relatively modern and rapidly growing 
form of litigation, what is simple litigation?  Simple litigation pits the 
defendant and the plaintiff against each other in a bipolar proceeding 
umpired by the judge and dominated by attorneys.318  Simple Litigation is St. 
Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.319  In St. Paul, the Red Cab 
Company sued St. Paul Mercury and its agent, a man referred to only as 
Harlan, alleging that it had failed to provide insurance under the terms of a 
30-day binder.320  Though the parties were diverse—the Red Cab Company 
was an Indiana corporation while St. Paul Mercury and its agent hailed from 
Minnesota—the claim was brought in state court.321  At that time, the 
minimum amount for federal jurisdiction was $3000, and the pleading 
alleged $4000 in damages.322  The case was removed to federal court, and 
the trial resulted in a $1,162.98 judgment against the defendant.323  On 
 
the federal forum.  See id.  Unsurprisingly, the presence of similar actions filed in state court and 
thus outside the consolidation’s reach tend to frustrate its purpose.  See, e.g., Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2004).  In Retirement Systems, litigation from the 
WorldCom collapse had been consolidated in the Southern District of New York, and trial had been 
scheduled.  Id. at 421.  In Alabama, despite a request from the federal court that it delay trial until 
after federal proceedings had concluded, a state court handling similar litigation scheduled its trial 
prior to that of the consolidated action.  Id. at 422.  The district court’s attempt to enjoin the state 
proceedings was held to be outside its authority, and any inconvenience caused by the Alabama trial 
was insufficient to compel a different holding.  Id. at 430–31. 
 316.  State court “analogues” to the MDL do exist and function in a similar fashion, but their 
scope is so constricted jurisdictionally that they can hardly be considered the same device.  See 
MARK HERRMANN ET AL., STATEWIDE COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS: STATE COURT ANALOGUES TO 
THE FEDERAL MDL PROCESS 41 (2d ed. 2004) (noting the lack of “formalize[d] federal-state 
coordination mechanisms”).  While the mechanism cannot be found in state courts, it is true that 
state and federal courts are learning to coordinate overlapping litigation.  See William W. Schwarzer 
et al., Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 
1689, 1689–90 (1992).  Coordination between state proceedings is even rarer.  See HERRMANN 
supra, at 93. 
 317.  See In re: Skechers, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (“Skechers opposes centralization primarily on 
the grounds that the respective plaintiffs’ injuries vary and its liability in each action will hinge on 
highly individualized facts, such as those surrounding the causation of each plaintiff’s injuries and 
each plaintiff’s reliance on (and the materiality of) representations made about the toning shoe 
product.”). 
 318.  See Rhode, supra note 196, at 1187. 
 319.  303 U.S. 283 (1938).  For a discussion of the important role St. Paul has played in cases 
related to the question at hand, see supra notes 144–57 and accompanying text. 
 320.  St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 284. 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  See id. at 286. 
 323.  Id. at 285. 
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appeal, the panel refused to address the merits, holding that there was no 
subject matter jurisdiction and remanding to the state court.324  In reversing, 
the Supreme Court established the rule that the amount claimed by the 
plaintiff controls, so long as it is claimed in good faith, and that “[i]t must 
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the 
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”325  The real holding of the case 
was that developments subsequent to proper removal cannot deprive the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction.326  As an aside, and to illustrate that a 
plaintiff wishing to avoid removal has options, the court noted the ability to 
plead below the jurisdictional amount and avoid removal.327  In the case of 
simple litigation, there is no reason why this should not be so. 
With only one plaintiff, the sacrifice of forgoing a portion of the 
recovery is borne only by the party deciding to make that sacrifice.  This is 
in obvious contrast to the class action cases discussed in Part III, and this 
point alone seems like sufficient grounds to distinguish the cases.328  Further, 
St. Paul did not arise out of a mass tort.329  Thus, there were no concerns that 
procedural gymnastics could cause a different outcome that would then have 
preclusive effects on other parties.330  The interests of other parties were not 
even indirectly at stake.331  Finally, the “legal certainty” standard it 
established has provoked such unrest in Congress as to be abrogated at least 
in part.332 
This Comment need not argue that prudential rules should be different 
for complex cases than they are for simple cases like St. Paul.  Prudential 
rules are different between complex and simple cases.333  This is especially 
 
 324.  See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 90 F.2d 229, 229–30 (7th Cir. 1937), 
rev’d, 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (“The court cannot close its eyes to the obvious, nor go ahead with the 
trial of a cause of which it has no jurisdiction—even though, as here, both parties are desirous of 
having it try the cause.”).  
 325.  See St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 289. 
 326.  See id. at 293 (“[E]vents occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount 
recoverable, whether beyond the plaintiff's control or the result of his volition, do not oust the 
district court's jurisdiction once it has attached.”). 
 327.  See id. at 294. 
 328.  See supra Part III.B. 
 329.  See St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 284. 
 330.  See id. at 294.   
 331.  See id. at 284–85. 
 332.  See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, § 103, 28 U.S.C. § 
1446(c)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (creating a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for 
removal cases”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 15 (2011) (“The . . . ‘legal certainty’ standard[] 
that govern[s] the amount in controversy requirement when a plaintiff originally files in Federal 
court ha[s] not translated well to removal . . . .”). 
 333.  Cf. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 205, at 522 (“[C]lass actions differ 
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true in terms of plaintiff autonomy, and the rule referenced in St. Paul has no 
place in complex litigation, neither as a matter of fact334 nor as a matter of 
sound policy.335  Reliance on St. Paul is misplaced, and the case likely 
should be cited only for the proposition that jurisdiction is properly 
determined as of the time of removal.336  The case’s central holding remains 
vital; its dicta merits no particular exaltation. 
V.  BALANCING PLAINTIFF AUTONOMY WITH THE PURPOSES OF CAFA, 
CONCEPTS OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, AND CONCERNS FOR EFFICIENCY 
If binding stipulations and their relatives pose problems, they must be 
either prohibited entirely,337 greatly limited,338 or (and this seems to be the 
favored approach) admonished.339  The latter tack is even more feckless than 
it sounds.  Subsection A recounts the ways in which federal judges have 
dealt with binding stipulations at the district court level and illustrates why 
various rationales offered fall short.340  Subsection B explicates the Federal 
Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011,341 while subsection 
C begins by arguing that the Act should be extended to CAFA cases.  The 
balance of this penultimate Part concerns itself with solving the problems 
created by binding stipulations.  Application of legal342 and theoretical343 
principles militates toward the conclusion that binding stipulations should 
rarely be allowed.  For practical reasons, they should be entirely 
prohibited.344  And, finally, a more flexible approach, judicial review, is 
found wanting.345 
A.  Ineffective Judicial Techniques 
Because binding stipulations go hand-in-hand with remand, federal 
courts lose jurisdiction over the case and can offer no effective guidance to 
 
fundamentally from other litigation and therefore raise special problems.”).  This divergence is 
evidenced most clearly by the existence and widespread use of a rulebook just for complex litigation.  
See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed. 2004), available at 
http://public.resource.org/scribd/8763868.pdf.  
 334.  See supra notes 305–17 and accompanying text. 
 335.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 336.  See St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 293–94; see also supra Part IV.C.2. 
 337.  See infra notes 388–422 and accompanying text. 
 338.  See infra notes 423–29 and accompanying text. 
 339.  See supra notes 207–48 and accompanying text. 
 340.  See infra notes 346–63 and accompanying text. 
 341.  Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see 
infra notes 362–72 and accompanying text. 
 342.  See infra notes 388–402 and accompanying text. 
 343.  See infra notes 403–10 and accompanying text. 
 344.  See infra notes 411–22 and accompanying text. 
 345.  See infra notes 423–29 and accompanying text. 
KILLIAN-SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2012  10:23 AM 
[Vol. 40: 111, 2012] An Illusion of Sacrifice 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
169 
the litigation.346  Still, courts often address the legitimate concerns raised by 
counsel for the defense by professing their confidence that the mechanism 
will not be abused and their assurances that subsequent removal may be 
possible.347 
A pronouncement that removal will be permitted if at any time the 
amount in controversy inarguably exceeds $5 million ignores the reality of 
class action litigation.  The case is won or lost at the certification stage and 
almost assuredly will never go to trial.348  Therefore, plaintiffs’ counsel can 
ensure that the amount in controversy never exceeds $5 million by seeking 
only a settlement for less than that.349  At this point, their pay day is realized, 
and the absentee class members’ potential right to greater recovery is 
forfeit.350 
In other cases, the right of absent class members to opt out is cited as 
evidence that absentee class members will be protected.  In Tuberville v. 
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., the defendants argued that it was 
“inappropriate for [the] Plaintiff to bind the as-yet-unknown class members 
with her stipulation limiting the total recovery.”351  The court had no 
problem finding otherwise, first by referencing the maxim that “the plaintiff 
is . . . ‘master of the complaint’” and citing St. Paul, and then by continuing: 
As it is Plaintiff’s prerogative to define the class as she chooses . . . 
she may . . . define the method and means through which relief is to 
be obtained for the class.  It is of no moment that Plaintiff currently 
qualifies for inclusion in other nationwide class actions concerning 
the same product.  The Plaintiff may assert her own claims, and she 
 
 346.  Because the decision to remand is based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court 
can bind or direct the parties in any way.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. Menu Foods, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 
1221 (D. Haw. 2007) (treating a motion to stay proceedings as mooted by a determination that 
remand was proper). 
 347.  See, e.g., Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 06-592-HA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
95697, at *9–10 (D. Or. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Here, if plaintiff 
prevails on her claims in state court, she cannot recover more than her prayer of five million dollars, 
and, as discussed above, if she increases that prayer her claims will then be subject to removal.”). 
 348.  See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 349.  Of course, as Judge Easterbrook pointed out, if the court refuses to approve such a 
settlement, additional problems are created and either removal would then be allowed, an inefficient 
proposition, or recovery would exceed $5 million and the plaintiff will not have been bound at all.  
See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
 350.  See, e.g., McNally v. Esmark, Inc. (In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig.), 427 F. Supp. 
1211, 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (preclusive effect attaching to all class members who failed to opt out of 
previous related litigation). 
 351.  Tuberville v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., No. 1:11–cv–01016, 2011 WL 1527716, at 
*3–4 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 21, 2011). 
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may set the terms for her class.352 
Due process concerns are brushed aside with the observation that 
“putative class members could simply opt out of the class and pursue their 
own remedies or join a different ongoing class action if they feel that the 
limitations placed on the class by the Plaintiff are too restrictive.”353  But, to 
be adequate, notice need not include a statement of legal tactics to be 
employed.354  Further, notice and opt-out requirements will not be 
established by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but will vary 
from state to state, even if the text of the class action statute is identical or 
nearly so.355  Implicitly, then, the court is relying on state procedural 
 
 352.  Id. at *4. 
 353.  Id. 
 354.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  The provision requires that notice in the case of all (b)(3) 
classes include: 
(i) the nature of the action; 
(ii) the definition of the class certified; 
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so 
desires; 
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; 
(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and 
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 
Id. 
  The purposes of the first three provisions are to provide “in an understandable format, 
sufficient information about the specific lawsuit to allow a class member to” decide if opting out or 
exercising the right to make an appearance is in her best interests.  7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1787 (3d ed. 2005).  While the existence of a stipulation 
of damages seems pertinent information to that decision, nothing in the text of the rule demands that 
it be included.  Also of note is the fact that notice is only sent after the class has been certified.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see also 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1788 (3d ed. 2005) (“[Notice] should be sent as soon as practicable after the court 
determines that the class action is proper [and not before].”).  Of course, at this point the question of 
adequate representation has already been answered as part of the certification process.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (g).  And there is great weight to the argument that class counsel willing to stipulate 
to damages (thereby foregoing a large portion of damages) merely to circumvent CAFA is serving 
her own interests and not the interest of the class.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text; infra 
notes 403–10 and accompanying text; cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 
(2011) (observing the “perverse incentives” created when some claims of the class are sacrificed to 
make class certification more likely). 
 355.  See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2377 (2011) (“If a State’s procedural 
provision tracks the language of a Federal Rule, but a state court interprets that provision in a 
manner federal courts have not, then the state court is using a different standard and thus deciding a 
different issue.”); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (analyzing 
the notice provided by a Kansas state court under state rules, observing that it need only satisfy a 
constitutional due process requirement—as distinct from the strictures of Rule 23—and finding it 
constitutional).  Professor Underwood vividly describes the reality of class action notice: 
 The large font screams at the reader “IMPORTANT NOTICE: IF YOU WERE THE 
PURCHASER OF A CELLULAR TELEPHONE MANUFACTURED BY A.B.C. 
CORPORATION FROM JANUARY 1, 2000, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2003, 
PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION . . . .” What follows this 
attention-getting language is typically much smaller-sized print with case information 
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safeguards.  Because CAFA was designed in part to get additional cases in 
federal courts where absentee plaintiffs could be better protected from unfair 
settlements,356 it seems odd to rely on a presumption that states will protect 
absentee class members in justifying remand. 
Least persuasive of all is the argument that due process concerns are 
inapplicable because a class action has not yet been certified.357  Therefore, 
there are no absent class members.358  This is a real head-scratcher.  One 
need not make a deep, controversial359 inquiry into legislative intent to 
understand that CAFA was designed to prevent class action abuses.360  It 
would be ironic indeed if abuse of the class action device were permissible 
in order to circumvent a system designed to prohibit class action abuses.  
Due process concerns should inform every stage of the litigation.361 
The worst approach recorded occurred in the Sixth Circuit, where the 
use of binding stipulations seems to be picking up.  Instead of addressing the 
adequate representation argument, the district court blithely observed that 
the state court could itself answer that question on remand and that, if the 
representation were inadequate, the class would not be certified and the 
 
often indecipherable to most lay persons.  The receipt of such a document, or the chance-
spotting of this language in a newspaper, is frequently the first and perhaps the only 
“notice” class members may receive, informing them that they have been injured 
economically, that they are litigants in a lawsuit they knew nothing about, pending in a 
forum they have never visited, and that they are being represented by a lawyer they have 
never met.  The litigants have just entered the mysterious and controversial realm of a 
consumer class action lawsuit in America. 
Underwood, supra note 48, at 392. 
 356.  See supra notes 42–58 and accompanying text. 
 357.  See, e.g., Tuberville v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., No. 1:11–cv–01016, 2011 WL 
1527716, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 21, 2011) (dismissing due process and adequacy concerns with the 
“important” observation that “the Plaintiff in the case at bar has not yet been named class 
representative, nor has the class been certified by any court”). 
 358.  See id. 
 359.  See Kanner, supra note 39, at 1660.  Kanner’s argument is both predictable and off the 
mark.  While, for purposes of this Comment, regular citations to the legislative record are only 
appropriate, they are not necessary in finding that binding stipulations conflict with Rule 23.  See 
infra Part V.C.2.a.  Further, Kanner’s “Argument for a Narrow Application,” which implicitly 
purports to rely on textualism, turns out to be based on a non-textual presumption against federal 
jurisdiction, a proposition that has no support in CAFA’s clear purpose to expand federal 
jurisdiction.  See Kanner, supra note 39, at 1662 (“CAFA did not change well-settled and core 
jurisdictional principles and rules.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
§ 2(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (2006) (Findings and Purposes). 
 360.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, § 2(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (2006) (describing 
“abuses of the class action device” in the Findings and Purposes section). 
 361.  Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“[T]he Due Process Clause 
of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent 
class members.” (emphasis added)). 
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claim would proceed as a single individual’s action.362  This is no answer.  
The analysis is no different from conceding inadequate representation but 
wishing the parties better luck in state court where the judge might see 
things differently.  The fact that the state judge might see things differently 
is why CAFA exists in the first place.363  The proper approach is not to shunt 
the problem off to state courts. 
B.  The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011: An 
Inconsequential Step in the Right Direction 
Aimed in part at lowball and indeterminate complaints,364  the Federal 
Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 (“the Act”)365 
serves as an imperfect model for how the problem should be viewed.  While 
nothing in the Act deals with binding stipulations, its tone and tenor indicate 
that tactics designed to defeat removal jurisdiction are to be discouraged.366  
Under the Act, the “sum demanded” in the pleading represents the amount in 
controversy, except where the plaintiff seeks nonmonetary relief or files the 
complaint in a state that either prohibits prayers for “specific sums” or 
allows “recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded.”367  In such 
cases, if the trial court finds by a mere preponderance of the evidence that 
section 1332(a)’s minimum jurisdictional amount is satisfied, removal is 
proper.368 
By its terms, the relevant provisions of the Act affect only diversity 
actions brought under section 1332(a).369  CAFA cases, of course, are 
granted jurisdiction by section 1332(d).370  One exception of possible 
significance is the statute’s broad rule that a case may be removed to federal 
court “on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than one  
 
 362.  See McClendon v. Challenge Fin. Investors Corp., No. 1:11 CV 1597, 2011 WL 5361069, at 
*5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2011).  
 363.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a)(4), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Findings and 
Purposes).   Relying on legislative intent is in no way problematic where, as here, the conclusion can 
be plainly inferred from reading the law’s findings and purpose clause, which was subject to 
bicameral passage and presentment.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 364.  See William Baude, Clarification Needed: Fixing the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification 
Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 34–35 (2012), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/as 
sets/fi/110/Baude.pdf. 
 365.  Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 366.  See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 § 103(b)(3)(C), 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(c) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (providing protections against “bad faith” pleading by 
plaintiffs and easing the burden’s standard of proof in showing that removal is proper); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 112-10, at 15 (2011) (citing “removal-defeating strategies designed to keep the case in state 
court” as a basis for the amendments). 
 367.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2). 
 368.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B). 
 369.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b), 1446(c). 
 370.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
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year” after its filing if “the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent 
a defendant from removing the action.”371  If “bad faith” were construed to 
include stipulations, the Act might make a difference in CAFA cases.  
However, such an argument relies on a finding that a stipulation does, in 
fact, indicate bad faith, and the passage of the Act does nothing to change 
the answer to a question most courts have already answered in the 
negative.372 
The Act’s approach to 1332(a) diversity cases with regard to lowball 
and indeterminate complaints should be extended to 1332(d) cases, i.e., 
CAFA cases, but this change cannot and should not be initiated by the 
courts.  Such interpretation would contradict a plain reading of the statute, 
which unambiguously limits the statute’s scope to traditional diversity 
cases.373  Not only would a wider reading be problematic at the theoretical 
level of statutory interpretation, such a reading would contradict the 
approach utilized by the Supreme Court in analogous cases.374  Therefore, 
the improvements described here should be made by Congress rather than 
judges.  While the Act is a step in the right direction, for purposes of solving 
the problems created by binding stipulations it is an inconsequential one. 
C.  Fixing the Problem 
1.  Of Complaints Lowballed and Indeterminate 
Correcting the problem of binding stipulations will mean little if lowball 
and indeterminate complaints accomplish the same ends without even 
pretending to bind the plaintiffs.375  Inconsequential as it may be in its 
present form, the Act provides the mechanism for fixing the problems of 
 
 371.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c). 
 372.  See, e.g., Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(embracing a plaintiff’s option to plead damages beneath the jurisdictional minimum as a method of 
avoiding federal jurisdiction and refusing to find bad faith on that basis). 
 373.  See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 
103, 125 Stat. 758 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (2006 & Supp. 2011)). 
 374.  See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1440 
(2010) (“[E]vidence of the New York Legislature’s purpose is pretty sparse.  But even accepting the 
dissent’s account of the Legislature’s objective at face value, it cannot override the statute’s clear 
text.”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566–67 (2005) (holding that § 
1367 “by its plain text overruled” a pair of Supreme Court cases and refusing to inquire into 
legislative history).  In any event, the legislative history seemingly militates toward the conclusion 
that removal under CAFA was intentionally ignored.  See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 16 (2011) 
(repeatedly citing the minimum amount in controversy specifically as $75,000). 
 375.  See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying notes. 
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lowball and indeterminate complaints in CAFA cases.  Analogous 
provisions should be drafted and enacted that treat such complaints 
identically, as they will now be treated in Section 1332(a) actions.  This 
proposal is nothing new.376  However, the Act’s enactment now allows us to 
see what such an act would look like.377 
The provisions were designed: “[T]o address issues relating to 
uncertainty of the amount in controversy when removal is sought, e.g., when 
state practice either does not require or permit the plaintiff to assert a sum 
claimed or allows the plaintiff to recover more than an amount asserted.”378 
 This is exactly our problem.  As the House Report states, judicial 
approaches to the issue have not always fared well, especially in cases of 
lowball complaints where the amount pleaded is in no way binding.379  
Legislation should be passed that functions in a manner identical to 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2): Where the state does not to permit a “specific sum” to 
be pleaded—the indeterminate complaint—or where the sum pleaded will 
not be binding—the lowball complaint—the defendant can assert the amount 
in controversy in his notice of removal.380  The defendant in that case would 
 
 376.  See Kristen L. Wenger, Note, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Limits of Its Text 
and the Need for Legislative Clarification, Not Judicial Interpretation, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 678 
(2011). 
 377.  In pertinent part, the Act amends 28 U.S.C. 1446(c) by adding the following two paragraphs: 
(2) If removal of a civil action is sought on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by 
section 1332(a), the sum demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed 
to be the amount in controversy, except that— 
(A) the notice of removal may assert the amount in controversy if the initial 
pleading seeks— 
(i) nonmonetary relief; or 
(ii) a money judgment, but the State practice either does not permit demand 
for a specific sum or permits recovery of damages in excess of the amount 
demanded; and 
(B) removal of the action is proper on the basis of an amount in controversy 
asserted under subparagraph (A) if the district court finds, by the preponderance of 
the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount specified in 
section 1332(a). 
 (3)(A) If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable solely because the 
amount in controversy does not exceed the amount specified in section 1332(a), 
information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or 
in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an ‘other paper’ under subsection (b)(3). 
(B) If the notice of removal is filed more than 1 year after commencement of the 
action and the district court finds that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the 
actual amount in controversy to prevent removal, that finding shall be deemed bad 
faith under paragraph (1). 
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 103, 125 
Stat. 758, 760–61 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (2006 & Supp. 2011)). 
 378.  H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 15. 
 379.  Id. 
 380.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).  Note that the rare binding ad damnum clause is 
left unaffected by this provision.  This makes sense outside the class action context because it serves 
as a binding stipulation.  See Noble-Allgire, supra note 69, at 720–21.  The plaintiff, in effect, is 
waiving any claim to a greater amount of damages.  See id.  “The defendant, therefore, has no right 
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then need only to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount 
in controversy exceeds $5 million for the court to maintain jurisdiction.381 
In the case of an indeterminate complaint that left the defendant unable 
to ascertain the amount in controversy, section 1446(c)(3)’s analogue would 
be implicated.  Under its provisions, if discovery led to evidence that the 
amount in controversy was, in fact, satisfied, the defendant would have 
thirty days to remove pursuant to section 1446(b)(3).382  Finally, the 
protections of subparagraph 1446(c)(3)(B) make intentional obfuscation of 
the amount in controversy bad faith per se, thus extending the removal 
timetable pursuant to section 1446(c)(1).383  An analogous provision should 
be enacted that applies to CAFA cases. 
2.  Binding Stipulations 
Of course, the problem addressed leaves the specific question of this 
Comment unanswered: What is to be done with binding stipulations?  For 
reasons theoretical, legal, and practical, the right answer is the most extreme.  
Judges should impose a per se rule against giving effect to any purported 
binding stipulations.  The theoretical reasons for such a rule have their basis 
primarily in agency theory.384  The legal reasons flow naturally from 
considerations of due process and the obligatory rigorous inquiry into Rule 
23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement.385  The practical reasons stem from 
considerations of complex litigation and efficiency.386  While, as previously 
acknowledged, the power of the judiciary to impose such rules is not 
plenary, it certainly extends far enough to ban this practice.387 
a.  The Legal Basis for a (Near) Outright Prohibition of Binding 
 
to have the case tried in federal court because his or her exposure is clearly limited to an amount that 
falls below the federal jurisdictional threshold.”  Id. at 692.  Because it is effective as a binding 
stipulation, the problems it raises are problems of adequate representation, and the practice should be 
banned on Rule 23(a)(4) and due process grounds.  See discussion infra Part V.C.2.a. 
 381.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B). 
 382.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(A).  The operative portion of section 1446(b)(3) provides that “if 
the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 
days after receipt by the defendant . . . of . . . other paper from which it may first be ascertained that 
the case is one which is or has become removable.”   
 383.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1), (3)(B). 
 384.  See infra note 403 and accompanying text. 
 385.  See infra note 398 and accompanying text. 
 386.  See infra notes 411–22 and accompanying text. 
 387.  The authority to impose the rule comes directly from Rule 23’s adequacy requirement, see 
FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), and the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. amend. V, 
XIV.  




The problems with binding stipulations are fundamental.  They are 
constitutional in scope.388  They strike to the heart of any conceptions of 
fairness.389 
The class action has its roots in equity.390  In addition to being 
concerned with efficiency,391 it must be, and always has been, limited by 
considerations of justice.392  Some of its inherent limitations raise profound 
questions in this regard, many of which have been the subject of intense 
scholarly debate.393  The binding stipulation, however, is not an integral 
component of the class action device.  Its relatively modern origins are in 
bipolar litigation,394 and its use need not be extended beyond, to the realm of 
class action. 
That a class action will have wide-ranging preclusive effects is not a 
contested proposition.395  Rather, the preclusive effects make the class action 
a worthwhile device.396  It is also a source of danger to absentee class 
 
 388.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) 
(explicitly equating adequate representation with due process). 
 389.  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).  As the Supreme Court, 
speaking through Justice Potter Stewart in one of his last opinions, put it: 
 For all its consequence, “due process” has never been, and perhaps can never be, 
precisely defined. . . .“[U]nlike some legal rules,” . . . due process “is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”  Rather, the 
phrase expresses the requirement of “fundamental fairness,” a requirement whose 
meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.  Applying the Due Process Clause is 
therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what “fundamental fairness” 
consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then 
by assessing the several interests that are at stake. 
Id. at 24–25 (citation omitted). 
 390.  7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 2005).  It is 
worth remembering that equity is defined as “[f]airness; impartiality; evenhanded dealing” and “[t]he 
body of principles constituting what is fair and right; natural law.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 391.  See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974). 
 392.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999) (refusing to allow a 
settlement that would bind future claimants to its terms notwithstanding the conceded efficiency of 
the plan).   
 393.  See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class 
Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 866 (1977) (“Depending on their persuasions, judges, lawyers, and 
laymen either praise or curse [the class action] . . . .”); see also TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra 
note 51, at 341 (“No other federal rule of civil procedure has generated as much debate, or as much 
division, as the modern class action rule—Rule 23.”). 
 394.  See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 395.  See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
717, 718–20 (2005) (assuming preclusive effects and exploring how far they should range).  Indeed, 
the crux of the “fierce debate” over preclusion that Professor Wolff describes is simply whether 
ostensibly precluded parties should be able to attack binding judgments collaterally by alleging 
inadequate representation.  See supra notes 49, 196–97. 
 396.  See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 
2005). 
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members, making necessary Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement and Rule 
23(e)’s settlement review procedure.397  While this problem is essentially a 
Rule 23(a)(4) problem, the fact that Rule 23(e) can be avoided by way of 
stipulation, which would entirely denude the provision, vividly illustrates a 
key problem with binding stipulations.398 
The legal analysis should hinge on Rule 23(a)(4), which requires class 
representatives and, by extension, class counsel, to “fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.”399  As is the case with each of Rule 23(a)’s 
four requirements, it is already well established that the inquiry is to be 
“rigorous.”400  While Rule 23 concededly only applies in the certification 
context, it is clear that Rule 23(a)(4) should be considered “at all times” 
because of the specter of the Due Process clause.401  “[C]ounsel’s greater 
concern for receiving a fee than for pursuing the class claims” can constitute 
inadequate representation.402 
 
 397.  See 7A, 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1765, 
1797 (3d ed. 2005). 
 398.  As discussed infra, notes 423–29, parties in a class action cannot settle unless the court 
reviews the agreement and finds it fair and adequate.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  Binding stipulations, if 
allowed, both wrest from federal courts the ability to make such an assessment and simultaneously 
place an upper limit on the plaintiffs’ recovery.   
 399.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (expressly imposing an identical 
fiduciary duty upon class counsel). 
 400.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).  It is worth pointing 
out that the application of a less-than-rigorous analysis of Rule 23(a)(2) was recently rejected 
soundly by the Supreme Court.  See id. at 2550–57 (conducting an intensive analysis into 
commonality).  The district court, which was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court in Dukes, 
cited the requirement that it undertake a “rigorous” analysis but then qualified the rule by staking a 
claim to “broad discretion.”  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 143 (N.D. Cal. 2004), 
aff’d, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  The requirement of commonality 
then became transmuted into a “permissive and minimal burden.”  See id. at 166.  Just as the rigor of 
23(a)(2) has been vindicated, so too should the rigor necessary in a proper (a)(4) analysis.  At least 
one district court, perhaps recognizing the rule’s constitutional basis, seems to have applied 
heightened scrutiny to the adequacy requirement.  See Hettinger v. Glass Specialty Co., 59 F.R.D. 
286, 296 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (“[Rule 23(a)(4)] must be strictly construed and stringently applied, since 
many absent class members will be bound by the judgment.”); see also 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1769 (3d ed. 2005) (“[B]ecause of the broad binding 
effect of class-action judgments, serious attention is given to the adequacy of representation of those 
absent class members who will be bound by the judgment.”). 
 401.  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 
U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940)); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform is Not Enough: Assuring More 
Than Merely “Adequate” Representation in Class Action Cases, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 932 (2004) 
(“Adequacy of representation may be challenged at any stage of a class action, and it is a 
prerequisite both for class certification and for a binding judgment.”). 
 402.  Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 7A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND  PROCEDURE § 1769.1 (1st ed. 1986)); see 
also 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1769.1 (3d ed. 
2005) (“[T]he substantial attorney fees that may be awarded also may mean that at some point—in 
KILLIAN-SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2012  10:23 AM 
 
178 
b.  Aligning the Interests: How Prohibiting Binding Stipulations 
Minimizes Agency Costs 
On the more theoretical end of the spectrum, prohibiting stipulations is a 
clean and clear way of reducing the agency cost problems that plague class 
actions.403  While the recent rise of big plaintiffs’ firms has arguably 
antiquated Professor Coffee’s model404—”class counsel as a solo practitioner 
or small law firm, cohesive in its desire to maximize law firm profit and 
capable of pursuing that one overriding interest by pegging case investment 
to expected fees”405—even his critics seem to concede its retained vitality in 
“comparatively smaller cases” of, say, $5 million.406  The more divergent the 
interests between the agent and the principal, the higher the agency costs.407  
Prohibiting binding stipulations unfortunately deprives the plaintiffs’ 
attorney of a weapon in his arsenal, but it also aligns his interests more 
cleanly with his client’s.408  Professor Coffee argues that “class members, as 
 
particular when settlement discussions take place—the attorneys’ interests and those of the class will 
conflict.”). 
 403.  See supra note 72. 
 404.  See Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4–5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1924278. 
 405.  Id. at 4. 
 406.  See id. at 55 (“It would not make sense to litigate a case involving only, say, $5 million in 
actual damages the way plaintiffs prosecuted [previously cited cases] each of which involved an 
investment of lodestar and hard costs by class counsel, collectively, well in excess of $5 million.”).  
The cases Professor Ratner cited involved damages conceivably in the billions of dollars, and his 
argument is that agency theory analysis might be outdated in view of the modern plaintiffs’ firm, 
which pursues cases with a vigor not easily tied to bottom line considerations.  See id. at 47–55.  
“[R]elatively lower value, smaller cases more clearly require counsel to at least attempt to calibrate 
case-investment decisions,” observes Professor Ratner, a concession that the agency cost problems 
and causes Professor Coffee identified remain pertinent at least as to those cases.  See id. at 55. 
  It is interesting to note that Professor Ratner, in arguing that there has been a paradigm shift 
for plaintiffs’ class action attorneys, develops a typology of such attorneys.  See id. at 23–24.  There 
are big firms, which get no special treatment but are the focus of his article.  See id. at 23.  Then 
there is a subset of small firms types: “small firms with big aspirations”—these firms earn his 
endorsement and seem to be youngling big firms; “small firms with small aspirations”—firms of this 
sort “tend to file ‘copycat’ complaints [and] are more likely to be driven at any given moment and to 
the extent practicable by hoped-for attorneys’ fees;” and finally, “outsider firms,” which include 
“professional objectors, often solo practitioners, who intervene in class litigation at specific points, 
often just to hold up larger firms for a share of the fee, by threatening to delay finality, and thus 
payment.”  Id. at. 23–24.  According to Professor Ratner, “[t]hese last two categories of small firms 
are commonly described within the plaintiffs’ class action bar, colloquially, as ‘bottom feeders.’”  Id. 
at 24.  The very act of filing a binding stipulation seems to demonstrate an emphasis on outcome and 
profit that, if it does not belie Professor Ratner’s model, at least suggests that the firms employing 
the tactic belong in one of the last two categories of small firms.  And the recognition, supra, that 
cases of less than $5 million also demand closer inspection of ultimate profitability militates toward 
that same conclusion.    
 407.  See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189–
90 (1987) (describing agency problems as the result of divergent interests between the plaintiff and 
the attorney). 
 408.  By taking the case, the plaintiffs’ lawyer has “effectively purchase[d] an equity interest in 
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the principals, should be deemed to have consented to the representation 
only if the agency costs associated with the relationship have been 
minimized.”409  Abolishing the practice of binding stipulations accomplishes 
just that.410 
c.  Practical Reasons for Rejecting Binding Stipulations 
Under perfect circumstances, there is no principled reason that binding 
stipulations should be completely prohibited.  If each of the class members 
not only got an opt-out notice but understood it—grasped the tactical 
decision being made to forego a portion of the possible recovery—and 
individually approved of such a technique, that would be a start.  That 
creates a situation analogous to St. Paul.411 
Still, questions of national importance and reverse federalism would 
remain.412  If a class action were of the sort that gave state judges the final 
word on issues affecting the nation at large—the very cases that CAFA was 
designed to usher into federal court, that is413—the presence of a binding 
stipulation should not outweigh Congress’s unambiguous preference that the 
case be heard in a federal forum.414  So, clearly another carve-out would 
need to be designed to account for this consideration.  An exception to the 
exception, if you will. 
If this all sounds too complicated and ripe for inefficient motion practice 
between litigants, that is only because it is.415  CAFA is already too 
 
the litigation from the plaintiff, offering his or her future services in exchange for a percentage of the 
recovery.”  Id. at 189.  The investment comes primarily in the form of time and resources spent in 
pursuing the litigation.  See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. 
Rev. 72, 76 (1983).  As a rational and risk-averse actor, the incentive to settle quickly, thus ensuring 
a profit while minimizing opportunity costs, is great.  See Leslie, supra note 55, at 1042.  Keeping 
the case in state court increases the probability of class certification, which in turn, makes a lucrative 
settlement practically a foregone conclusion.  See supra note 193.  However, none of the rational 
calculus considers the plaintiff, who is typically more interested in a vigorous pursuit of her claim 
than the lawyer who wants to minimize risk.  See Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, 
supra note 72, at 685–86.  Thus, binding stipulations represent a paradigmatic example of the agency 
cost problems that plague class actions, and the only thing that makes them remarkable is how easily 
they can be eliminated. 
 409.  Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 46, at 376. 
 410.  Concededly, this modest proposal does not solve the agency cost problem, not by a long 
shot.  But it certainly does its part to minimize agency costs.  See id. 
 411.  See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 412.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 413.  See supra notes 272–74 and accompanying text. 
 414.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (2006) (Findings 
and Purposes). 
 415.  Consider the current federalism-based exceptions and the litigation they have spawned. 
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complicated.416  Those few cases in which binding stipulations would be 
theoretically permissible do not outweigh considerations of judicial 
economy.  The creativity and tenacity of lawyers on both sides proves this 
point.417  Instead of remedying the problem identified, any compromise 
would only worsen it.  The likely result would be a slew of new circuit 
splits, new theories, and new arguments.418  CAFA is supposed to promote 
efficiency and yet it has already led to inefficiencies of its own.419  This 
approach would only compound the problem.  If plaintiff autonomy were a 
concept grounded in the Constitution, perhaps this outcome would be 
unavoidable.420  However, the rule announced in St. Paul is not one of 
constitutional dimensions.421  For the purposes of class actions, the idea that 
the plaintiff is the master of his own complaint has too little to commend it 
and too much to condemn it.422  It should be discarded. 
d.  Judicial Scrutiny: An Alternative Approach Considered and Rejected 
If a per se rule against binding stipulations is unsatisfactory, courts 
could always subject each proffered stipulation to scrutiny.  Such an exercise 
would be analogous to the scrutiny already applied for actual settlements.423  
 
 416.  See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 51, at 317 (describing CAFA’s provisions as “the 
most complicated, fact-intensive jurisdictional provisions that Congress has ever created”). 
 417.  See supra notes 63–84 and accompanying text.  Defendant’s attorneys show their tenacity by 
the sheer number of cases removed to federal court pursuant to CAFA, and by the novel arguments 
advanced when a case seems to clearly fall outside the statute.  See, e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield 
Greenwich Ltd., 676 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting an “astoundingly expansive” 
reading of CAFA by the defendants and remanding to state court where there were less than 100 
plaintiffs); Walker v. Motricity, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (remanding and, sua sponte, 
imposing sanctions on the defendant for frivolous removal), rev’d in part sub nom. Walker v. 
Morgan, 386 F.App’x 601 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 418.  The factual inquiry alone—into whether (1) the entire class consented to the stipulation or, 
in the alternative, whether (2) the class, as defined, could have a preclusive effect on unforeseen 
individuals—could conceivably be relitigated each time the exception was invoked.  And the 
exceptions currently in place to keep local matters in local courts already show a marked amenability 
to litigation, see Stephen J. Shapiro, Applying the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 77, 85–88 
(2007) (describing the various legal issues created by the home state and local exceptions and the 
circuit split that has developed), which a “national importance” exception would surely be subject to. 
 419.  See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 1567 (“The result [of vague and ambiguous 
provisions] has been much more social waste due to CAFA than to comparable statutes.  And that 
waste will—ironically—offset any of the benefits that CAFA’s supporters were attempting to create 
by corralling ‘wasteful’ class action litigation.”). 
 420.  That is to say, an outright prohibition on binding stipulations would possibly run afoul of the 
Constitution and any attempt to reign them in would, of necessity, be nuanced, even if that led to 
inefficiency.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 958–59 (1983) (explaining, in a different 
context, that when the Constitution and considerations of efficiency conflict, efficiency must be 
swept aside). 
 421.  See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 422.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 423.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).  Under the rule, a binding settlement may be approved “only 
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The inquiry would again revolve primarily around adequacy.424  Essentially, 
if a settlement for less than $5 million could be approved by the court, the 
stipulation would be permitted. 
The primary problem with this approach is that at the removal stage the 
facts are not often developed enough to allow for a meaningful inquiry.425  
This creates obvious problems vis-à-vis efficiency.  Hearings are required 
under Rule 23(e), and the inquiry is fact-intensive.426  Such an inquiry 
presupposes a developed record.427  But perhaps the larger problem is that 
courts would be asked to undertake, with limited information, an analysis 
they could ill afford to get wrong.  For example, what happens if factual 
developments make the value of a case suddenly grow exponentially?428 
The fundamental point is that the adequacy of a stipulation cannot be 
accurately determined until the record is developed enough that the 
adequacy of a proposed settlement could be determined, and these points 
will not often coincide because, by rule, cases must be removed in their very 
early stages and, to be effective, any purported stipulation would necessarily 
be made even prior to that point, likely at the very onset of the litigation.429  
Thus, pursuit of this compromise approach is inherently problematic.  It 
should be rejected. 
 
[if] after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”  Id. 
 424.  See 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797 (3d ed. 
2005). 
 425.  See infra notes 426–28. 
 426.  See 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797.1 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
 427.  See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 515 (2011). 
 428.  See Ratner, supra note 404, at 43 (noting that estimates and expectations are “mostly 
guesswork” that rely on events, some of which may be unforeseeable).  Professor Ratner uses two 
examples to illustrate his point: 
[A] race discrimination class action lawsuit against Texaco settled in 1996 for what was 
then a record amount—$176 million—after the plaintiffs obtained an audio-recording in 
which top company executives admitted to destroying documents responsive to discovery 
requests and used racial slurs to refer to the class action plaintiffs.  Similarly, in 
Holocaust-era class action litigation against several Swiss banks, . . . the value of the 
litigation was dramatically enhanced after a night-watchman rescued documents from the 
shredder that were arguably related to plaintiffs’ claims.  It is impossible to quantify and, 
at the same time, difficult to overstate how the evidence of the defendant’s document 
destruction added to the value of the litigation. 
Id. 
 429.  In class actions, it takes three years on average for cases to settle.  Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An 
Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
811, 820 (2010).  Questions of removal, by contrast, should typically be addressed within 60 days; 
the case must be removed within 30 days of the action’s filing, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b), 1453 
(2006), and the remand must then be requested within a new 30-day time period, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1446(c), 1447(c). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
A quick look back at Westley and Buttercup’s litigation.430  Westley, 
you recall, wanted to limit his lawsuit to less than $75,000, thereby avoiding 
federal court at the expense of potentially recovering less than he might 
otherwise have.  His case falls squarely within St. Paul’s facts,431 and the 
judge’s response should be simple: As you wish.  Buttercup, on the other 
hand, wants so badly to avoid federal court that she offers to make that same 
sacrifice, not only for herself but for the thousands of others she is under a 
duty to adequately represent.  Not only that, but we can be confident that she 
is not the one making the decision at all; her lawyers are.432  Her case can 
and should be distinguished from St. Paul because the sacrifice is borne by 
the class while the lawyers reap only benefits.433 
Allowing binding stipulations contradicts Rule 23(a)(4)’s command that 
absent class members be adequately represented and also violates their co-
extensive right to due process under the Constitution.434  Utilization of the 
tool creates perverse incentives for class action attorneys who can make a 
quick buck by filing a copycat lawsuit in a state court435 and submitting a 
binding stipulation that damages sought or recovered will not exceed $5 
million;436 conducting a reverse-auction with the defendants, thereby taking 
cases out from under the plaintiffs’ attorneys who expended considerable 
resources in investigating and pursuing the original claims;437 and finally 
pocketing huge fees while the class members get worthless coupons438 and 
are precluded from pursuing real justice.439 
This is not a parade of horribles.  This is Figueroa v. Sharper Image 
Corp.440 with only the introduction of a binding stipulation into the mix.441  
Prohibiting binding stipulations is not anti-consumer, pro-big business, pro-
defendant, or even anti-plaintiffs’ attorney.442  It is a rational reaction to a 
budding problem. 
 
 430.  See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 431.  See supra notes 318–20 and accompanying text. 
 432.  See Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 72, at 656 (noting that “lawyers 
today so totally dominate the process and pursue their own independent interests (which usually 
favor an early settlement)”). 
 433.  See supra notes 318–36 and accompanying text. 
 434.  See supra notes 371–83 and accompanying text. 
 435.  See supra note 389. 
 436.  See supra note 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 437.  See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 438.  See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text. 
 439.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 440.  517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 441.  See supra note 58. 
 442.  To borrow from Professor Ratner’s typology, the proposal would be only anti-bottomfeeder.  
See Ratner, supra note 404. 
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